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Building on simple information-theoretic concepts, we study two quantitative models of
information leakage in the pi-calculus. The ﬁrst model presupposes an attacker with an
essentially unlimited computational power. The resulting notion of absolute leakage, mea-
sured in bits, is in agreement with secrecy as deﬁned by Abadi and Gordon: a process has
an absolute leakage of zero preciselywhen it satisﬁes secrecy. The secondmodel assumes a
restricted observation scenario, inspired by the testing equivalence framework, where the
attacker can only conduct repeated success-or-failure experiments on processes.Moreover,
eachexperimenthasacost in termsof communicationeffort. The resultingnotionof leakage
rate,measured inbitsperaction, is inagreementwith theﬁrstmodel: themaximumamount
of information that can be extracted by repeated experiments coincides with the absolute
leakage A of the process. Moreover, the overall extraction cost is at least A/R, where R is the
rate of the process. The compositionality properties of the twomodels are also investigated.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In theﬁeldof language-based security, properties likenon-interference [17]have traditionally been studied in a functional,
all-or-nothing formulation. Only in recent years have models been proposed that enable forms of quantitative reasoning on
such properties. Our interest here is inmeasuring leakage of sensitive information due to program execution. For a sequential
program, it is natural to quantify this leakage by measuring the ﬂow of information between secret ("high") and public
("low") variables induced by the computed function. An elegant theory of quantitative non-interference in this vein has been
proposed by Clark et al. [10,12]. A comparison with this and other proposals in the literature is deferred to the concluding
section.
In this paper, we study quantitative models of information leakage in concurrent programs, that is processes described
in a process calculus. Processes come with no natural notion of computed function. Indeed, given a process, one is typically
interested in quantifying the leakage arising from its interactionwith the environment, hence in its observable behaviour. The
difference in intentwith respect to sequential programs can be illustrated by the following analogy. A smart-card implements
a function that takes documents as input and releases documents signedwith a secret key as output. However, typical attacks
targeting the secret key do not focus on the function itself, but rather on the behaviour of the card, in terms e.g. of observable
time variance of basic operations [20], or observable power consumption [21].
The starting point of our study is the notion of secrecy as formalized by Abadi and Gordon [1]. We will subsequently refer
to this particular formulation as ag-secrecy. This is a fairly general concept, although in [1] it was deﬁned in connection
with the spi- and, limited to some introductory examples, the pi-calculus. In this paper, we shall stick for simplicity to the
pi-calculus. Informally, ag-secrecy holds of a process P whose code mentions a parameter x representing a piece of sensitive
information, if the observable behaviour of P does not depend on the actual values xmay take on. In other words, an attacker
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cannot infer anything about x by interacting with P. The notion of "observable behaviour" is formalized in terms of a suitable
behavioural equivalence, such as may testing equivalence [14,5].
Although elegant and intuitive, ag-secrecy is in practice too strict. The behaviour of virtually any useful program that
protects a sensitive piece of information depends nontrivially on this information. Nevertheless, many such programs are
considered secure, on the grounds that the amount of leaked information is, on average, negligible. The average is taken here
over all possible values the sensitive informationmay take on. Consider a pin-checking process P(x) that receives a code from
a user and checks it against a 4-digits secret pin x, in order to authorize, or deny, a given operation. An attacker could easily
submit a speciﬁc code of its choice to P(x), say 4811, receive a deny and hence acquire negative information about x, i.e. "x
is not 4811". However, assuming x has been chosen at random, such a small leak of information should be of no concern. In
another scenario, an attacker could be allowed to query repeatedly P(x), so that, given enough time, he/she could determine x
with certainty. In this case, one is interested in quantifying the overall effort, in terms of interaction units (actions), necessary
for the attacker to do so. Or, in other words, one’s interest is in determining at which rate P(x) leaks sensitive information.
In the present paper, we propose two quantitativemodels of leakage for processes that address the issues outlined above.
The ﬁrst model is designed for measuring absolute leakage of P, while the secondmodel is designed for measuring the rate at
which information is leaked by P. As explained below, the twomodels correspond to different assumptions on the control an
attacker can exercise over P. The connections between these twomodels will also be clariﬁed. We will take an unconditional
security approach. Roughly, a "small leak" implies absence of attacks, while a "large leak" points to existence of attacks,
without implying that such attacks can be mounted in practice. A more precise account of our work follows.
After quickly reviewing a few notions from Information Theory that will be used in the paper (Section 2), we introduce
our reference language, a pi-calculus with data values (Section 3). In the ﬁrst model (absolute leakage), we presuppose an
attackerwith full control over the process. Implicitly, we assume the attacker: (a) knows the process code P(x), and (b), can, at
no cost, produce asmany copies as desired of the instance of P under consideration and run them. The role of these two strong
assumptions is twofold: on the one hand, they set up aworst-case scenario, providing security guarantees independent from
the computational power of actual attackers; on the other hand, they help to simplify the treatment of nondeterminism
in processes. In particular, a consequence of assumption (b) is that all possible ways in which P’s nondeterminism can be
resolved should be experienced by the attacker. Idealizing this, one can say that the attacker can tell the equivalence class (of
behaviours) the observed instance of P belongs to. A third assumption, commonly found when reasoning about protection
of conﬁdential data, is that: (c) the probability distribution of the data x is known to the attacker.
Weare interested in the average amount of information about x that is leaked to the attacker by P under these assumptions.
The average is taken over all values xmay take on. In the language of unconditional security, this scenario can be formalized
as follows. A piece of sensitive information is modeled as a random variable, say X . The a priori uncertainty of an adversary
about X is measured by the Shannon entropy H(X), expressed in bits [13]. For full generality, it is assumed that some "side-
information" Y , possibly related to X , is publicly available: the conditional entropy H(X | Y) measures the uncertainty about
X given that Y is known. To illustrate these notions in a concrete case, consider the pin-checking example. There, X represents
a randomly chosen 4-digits secret code, hence H(X) = log(104) ≈ 13.29 bits. Y might represent whether X = 4811 or not,
a piece of information the attacker might easily learn. Note that observing the event (X = 4811) reduces the uncertainty
about X to 0, while observing (X /= 4811) rules out one possibility reducing the uncertainty to log(104 − 1): on the average,
observing Y reduces the uncertainty of the attacker to H(X | Y) = 0 · Pr(X = 4811) + log(104 − 1) · (1− 1
104
) ≈ 13.28.
Any process P(x, y) and any two r.v.’s X and Y induce a new a random variable Z = P(X ,Y): following the discussion above,
it is reasonable to stipulate that Z takes as values "observable behaviours", that is, equivalence classes of a ﬁxed behavioral
equivalence (Section 4). Now, the conditional entropy H(X | Y , Z) quantiﬁes the uncertainty on X left after observing both Y
and Z . Hence the difference I = H(X | Y) − H(X | Y , Z) is the amount of uncertainty about X removed by observing Z = P(X ,Y),
that we take as the absolute leakage of P relative to X ,Y (Section 5). We prove that this notion is in full agreement with the
functional notionofag-secrecy. In the special casewhen there is no side-information, thismeans thatP(x) respectsag-secrecy
if and only if P(X) has an absolute leakage of 0 for every random variable X . We also offer two alternative characterizations
of zero-leakage, hopefully more amenable to automatic checking.
Next, we discuss the signiﬁcance of absolute leakage in relation to certain security measures well-known from the
literature (Section 6). Speciﬁcally, we show how to relate absolute leakage to the attacker’s error probability of guessing
the secret X given Z , and to the guesswork of X given Z , which measures the average number of attempts before correctly
guessing X , in a scenario similar to that of dictionary attacks against password systems.
The second model we consider (rate of leakage, Section 7), reﬁnes the previous scenario by introducing a notion of cost.
Adapting the testing equivalence framework from [14], we stipulate that an attacker can only conduct upon P repeated tests
T1, T2,... each yielding a binary answer, success or failure. The attacker has full control – in the sense of the ﬁrst model –
over the compound systems P||Ti, but not over P itself. The security measure we are interested in is the overall number of
synchronizations with P necessary for the adversary to extract one bit of information about X . Hence we deﬁne the rate
at which P leaks information in terms of the maximal number of bits of information per visible action conveyed by an
experiments P||Ti. We then give evidence that this is indeed a reasonable notion. First, we establish a relationship with the
ﬁrst model, showing that the absolute leakage A coincides with the maximum amount of information about X that can be
extracted by repeated experiments on P, and that this costs the adversary at least A/R, where R is the rate of P. Second, in
the vein of testing equivalence, we give an experiment-independent characterization of rate that only depends on the visible
M. Boreale / Information and Computation 207 (2009) 699–725 701
traces of the observed process. Extending the discussion of the absolute leakage model, we also clarify the relation of rate of
leakage to the attacker’s error probability and guesswork after an effort of N synchronizations.
The search for principles of compositional reasoning is a major motivation for studying information leakage in a process
calculus setting. In both models, we show that the leakage (rate) attributable to a global system cannot exceed the sum of
those imputable to individual sub-systems (with the exception of the parallel composition operator, in the case of rate of
leakage). We prove that under suitable conditions iteration does preserve rate, in the sense that the rate of * P equals that of
P, which is expected from a sensible notion of rate.
We will illustrate the application of the proposed models to a non-trivial example, a message-routing system inspired by
anonymity protocols in the style of Crowds [28] (Section 8).
Some discussion on the limitations of the present approach, remarks on further research and a discussion on related
works conclude the paper (Section 9). A table summarizing themain notations used throughout the paper and a few technical
deﬁnitions and proofs are reported in separate appendices (Appendices 9, 9, 9).
2. Preliminary notions
We brieﬂy recall a few concepts from probability and elementary Information Theory; see e.g. [13,33] for full deﬁnitions
and underlying motivations. Recall that a random variable (r.v.) is a function X :  → U where  is a probability space, U
(called the state space) is the carrier of a σ -algebra F and for each element F ∈ F, X−1(F) is an event of  (otherwise said, X
is measurable). In this paper, we shall conﬁne ourselves to discrete random variables, that is, random variable in which U is
an at most countable set and F is the power-set σ -algebra over U: this amounts to requiring that for each u ∈ U, X−1(u) is
an event of . We let X ,Y , ... range over discrete random variables. We say that a r.v. X is of type U, and write X : U, if U is
the state space of X (i.e. X() ⊆ U); we call elements of U outcomes of X . Unless otherwise stated, we shall assume the U is
ﬁnite. We deﬁne |X| as the number of possible outcomes of X , that is |X| def= |{u ∈ U|Pr(X = u) > 0}|. We shall make use of
the concepts of independent and uniformly distributed (u.d.) random variable, deﬁned as usual. As a function, every random
variable induces a partition into events of its domain , which is {X−1(u) |u ∈ X()}: we say that two random variables X
and Y are equivalent if they induce on  the same partition (this does not imply that X and Y coincide). A vector of random
variables X˜ = (X1, ...,Xn), where the Xi : Ui for 1 ≤ i ≤ n are r.v.’s deﬁned on the same probability space , is just a r.v. of type
U1 × · · · × Un.
Let X : U and Y : V be r.v. The entropy of X and the conditional entropy of X given Y are deﬁned, respectively, as:
H(X)
def= − ∑
u∈U
Pr(X = u) · log(Pr(X = u))
H(X | Y) def= ∑
v∈V
H(X | Y = v) · Pr(Y = v)
where all logarithms are taken to the base of 2, by convention 0 · log 0 = 0 and for any event e of,H(X | e) is the conditional
entropy of X given e, deﬁned as
H(X | e) def= −
∑
u∈U
Pr(X = u | e) · log(Pr(X = u | e) ) .
Example 2.1. Let X represent the randomchoice of a pin-code between 1 andN. Our a priori uncertainty about X ismeasured
by its entropy
H(X) = −
N∑
i=1
1
N
log
(
1
N
)
= logN .
Assume that, although ignoring the value of X , we get to know its parity, odd or even. Let Y be the r.v. that yields 1 if X is odd,
0 otherwise. Then, assuming N is even, our uncertainty about X after observing Y = 0 is measured by
H(X | Y = 0) = − ∑
i∈1..N
Pr(X = i | Y = 0) log
(
Pr(X = i|Y = 0)
)
= − ∑
i∈1..N, i odd
1
N/2
log
(
1
N/2
)
= log
(
N
2
)
= logN − 1
that is, observing Y = 0 reduces our uncertainty by 1 bit. Similarly, H(X | Y = 1) = logN − 1. Hence, the average uncertainty
after observing Y is
H(X | Y) = 1
2
H(X | Y = 0) + 1
2
H(X | Y = 1) = logN − 1 .
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Note that two equivalent random variables exhibit the same entropy and conditional entropies. For a vector
(X1, ...,Xn) of random variables, we shall abbreviate H
(
(X1, ...,Xn)
)
as H(X1, ...,Xn). The following fundamental (in)equalities
hold:
0 ≤ H(X) ≤ log |X| (1)
H(X ,Y) = H(X|Y) + H(Y) (chain rule) (2)
H(X1, ...,Xn) ≤ H(X1) + · · · + H(Xn) (3)
where: in (1), equality on the left holds iff X is a constant, and equality on the right holds iff X is u.d. on {u ∈ U|Pr(X = u) > 0};
in (3), equality holds iff the Xi’s are pairwise independent. Note that by (2) and (3),H(X|Y) = H(X) iff X and Y are independent.
If Y = F(X) for some function F then H(Y |X) = 0. Information on X conveyed by Y (aka,mutual information between X and Y) is
I(X;Y) def= H(X) − H(X | Y) .
By the chain rule, I(X;Y) = I(Y;X), and I(X;Y) = 0 iff X and Y are independent. Mutual information can be generalized
by conditioning on another r.v. Z: I(X;Y | Z) def= H(X | Z) − H(X | Z ,Y). Conditioning on Z may in general either increase or
decrease mutual information between X and Y . Note that entropy of a r.v. only depends on the underlying probability
distribution; thus any probability vector p˜ = (p1, ..., pn) (pi ≥ 0,
∑
i pi = 1) determines a single entropy value denoted H(p˜).
We shall often abbreviate the binary entropy H(p, 1− p) as B(p).
3. A process calculus
3.1. Syntax
Weassume a countable set of variablesV = {x, y, ...}, a family of non-empty, ﬁnite value-setsU = {U,V , ...}, and a countable
set of names N = {a, b, ...}, partitioned into a family of sorts S, S′, .... We let u, v be generic elements of a ﬁnite value-set. We
assume a ﬁxed function that maps each variable x to some T ∈ U ∪ {S, S′, ...}, written x : T , and say that x has type T; we
assume the inverse image of each T is inﬁnite. These notations are extended to tuples as expected, e.g. for x˜ = (x1, ..., xn) and
T˜ = (T1, ..., Tn), x˜ : T˜ means x1 : T1, ..., xn : Tn. By slight abuse of notation, we sometimes denote by T˜ the cartesian product
T1 × · · · × Tn.
An evaluation σ is a partial map from V to
⋃
U∈U U ∪ N that respects typing, that is, for each x ∈ dom(σ ), x : T implies
σ(x) ∈ T . We denote by [d˜/˜x] the evaluation mapping x˜ to d˜ component-wise. By tσ , where t is a term over an arbitrary
signature with free variables fv(t) ⊆ V, we denote the result of replacing each free variable x ∈ dom(σ ) ∩ fv(t) with σ(x).
We assume a language of logical formulae φ,ψ , .... We leave the language unspeciﬁed, but assume it includes a ﬁrst order
calculuswith variables V, that function symbols include all values inU and names as constants, and that the set of predicates
includes equality [x = y]. For φ and σ s.t. dom(σ ) ⊇ fv(φ), we write σ |= φ if φσ is valid (i.e. a tautology). If σ |= φ for all
evaluations σ s.t. dom(σ ) ⊇ fv(φ), then we write |= φ. As usual, φ ⇒ ψ means |= φ → ψ . We will often write φ(x˜) to indicate
that the free variables of φ are included in x˜, and, in that case, abbreviate φ[u˜/˜x] as φ(u˜).
The process language is a standard pi-calculus with variables and data values. We assume a countable set of identiﬁers
A,B, ... and use e, e′... to range over an unspeciﬁed set of expressions, that can be formed starting from variables, values and
names. The syntax of processes P,Q , ... is given by the constructors of inaction, silent preﬁx, input preﬁx, output preﬁx, boolean
guard, nondeterministic choice, restriction, parallel composition and process identiﬁer, according to the grammar below.
m ::= x
∣∣∣ a
P,Q ::= 0
∣∣∣ τ.P ∣∣∣ m(x˜).P ∣∣∣ me˜.P ∣∣∣ φP ∣∣∣ P + P ∣∣∣ (νb)P ∣∣∣ P|P ∣∣∣ A(e˜) .
Each identiﬁer A has an associated deﬁning equation of the form A(x˜)
def= P. Input preﬁxm(x˜). and restriction (νb) are binders
for x˜ and b, respectively, thus, notions of free variables (fv) and free names (fn) arise as expected. We identify processes
up to alpha-equivalence. We assume a few constraints on the syntax above: x˜ is a tuple of distinct elements in input preﬁx
and in A(x˜)
def= P, and in the latter fv(P) ⊆ x˜; φ is quantiﬁer-free. We assume a ﬁxed sorting system à laMilner. In particular,
each sort S has an associated sort object ob(S) = (T1, ..., Tk) (k ≥ 0). Here, each Ti is either a sort S or a value-set U from the
universe U. Informally, a process obeys this sorting system if in every input and output preﬁx, a name/variable m of sort S
carries a tuple of objects of the sort speciﬁed by ob(S); we omit the details that are standard. We let Po the set of processes
(possibly containing free variables) obeying these conditions and Pc its subset of closed processes. Notationally, we shall
often omit trailing 0’s, writing e.g. a.b. instead of a.b.0, we shall write
∑n
i=1 Pi for nondeterministic choice P1 + · · · + Pn, and
let replication !P denote the process deﬁned by the equation: !P def= P|!P.
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Table 1
Operational semantics of Pc.
(inp) a : S d˜ : ob(S)
a(x˜).P
ad˜−−→ P[d˜/x˜]
(out)
e˜ ↓ d˜
ae˜.P
ad˜−−→ P
(tau) −
τ.P
τ−→ P
(sum1)
P
μ−→ P′
P + Q μ−→ P′
(par1)
P
μ−→ P′ bn(μ) ∩ fn(Q ) = ∅
P|Q μ−→ P′ |Q
(com1)
P
(νc˜)ad˜−−−−→ P′ c˜ ∩ fn(Q ) = ∅ Q ad˜−−→ Q ′
P|Q τ−→ (νc˜)(P′ |Q ′)
(open) P
(νc˜)ad˜−−−−→ P′ a /= b b ∈ d˜
(νb)P
(νc˜,b)ad˜−−−−−→ P′
(res)
P
μ−→ P′ b /∈ n(μ)
(νb)P
μ−→ (νb)P′
(phi)
φ ↓ true P μ−→ P′
φP
μ−→ P′
(ide)
A(x˜)
def= P x˜ : T˜ d˜ : T˜ P[d˜/x˜] μ−→ P′
A(d˜)
μ−→ P′
3.2. Semantics
We assume over Pc the standard early operational semantics of pi-calculus. Transitions are the form P
μ−→ P′, where μ
is one of τ (invisible action), ad˜ (input action) or (νc˜)ad˜ with c˜ ⊆ d˜ \ {a} (output action) and d ::= a | u (name or value). We
let d˜ range over tuples of elements of names and/or values, let n(μ) denote the set of names occurring in μ and deﬁne the
set of bound names of μ as: bn(μ) = c˜ if μ = (νc˜)ad˜ and bn(μ) = ∅ otherwise. An evaluation function ↓ is presupposed that
maps closed expressions and formulae to values/names and to {true, false}, respectively, with the proviso that each name is
mapped to itself (a ↓ a). This is extended to tuples of expressions componentwise.
The operational semantics of Pc is given by the rules reported in Table 3.2. Symmetric versions of rules (sum1), (par1) and
(com1) are not shown for brevity.
A few standard notations will be made use of. In particular, for each visible (different from τ ) action α, P
α⇒ P′ means
P(
τ−→)* α−→ ( τ−→)*P′. Thisnotation isextended toanysequenceofvisibleactions s = α1 · · ·αn (i.e. a trace),P s⇒ P′, as expected.
Finally, P
s⇒ means that there is P ′ s.t. P s⇒ P′.
In the rest of the paper, we let  be a ﬁxed equivalence relation over Pc and denote by [Q ] the -equivalence class
of process Q . For the moment, we leave  unspeciﬁed, but assume it is included in trace equivalence [5], it includes strong
bisimulation [29], it preserves all operators of the calculus, except possibly input preﬁx, and it satisﬁes the monoid laws for
+ and |with 0 as unit. We will have more to say on the role played by speciﬁc behavioural equivalences later on (see Section
5.2).
Another conceptweshall relyupon is that of most general boolean, borrowed from[19,6], that is, themost general condition
under which two given open processes are equivalent.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (mgb). Let P(x˜) and Q (y˜) be two open processes, with x˜ : U˜ and y˜ : V˜ . We denote by mgb(P(x˜), Q (y˜)) a chosen
formula φ(x˜, y˜) s.t. for each u˜ ∈ U˜ and v˜ ∈ V˜ : P(u˜)  Q (v˜) if and only if φ(u˜, v˜) is true.
It is worthwhile to notice that, under certain assumptions, mgb’s for a pair of open pi-processes can be automatically
computed relying on a symbolic operational semantics [19,6]. Let us recall that a symbolic transition also carries a logical
formula: P
μ,φ−−−→ P′. Informally, φ represents the exact condition on the free variables of P under which the given transition
is enabled. For example, one has
([x = y]zv.P) | y(w).Q τ , [x=y]∧[y=z]−−−−−−−−−→ P|Q [v/w] .
In [19], an algorithm is described to compute mgb’s for a pair of processes both having ﬁnite symbolic transition systems, in
the case of strong bisimilarity.
4. Processes as random variables
This section is devoted to presenting a technical device that allowsus to transform (open) processes into randomvariables.
Let us deﬁne an open process as a pair (P, x˜), written P(x˜), such that x˜ is a tuple of distinct variables of some type U˜ ⊆ U and
P ∈ Po is such that fv(P) ⊆ x˜. When no confusion about x˜ arises, we shall abbreviate P[u˜/˜x] as P(u˜) and (P[y˜/˜x])(y˜) as P(y˜) (y˜ a
tuple of distinct variables.)
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Deﬁnition 4.1 (Open processes as random variables). Let P(x˜) be an open process and X˜ be a vector of random variables, with
x˜ : U˜ and X˜ : U˜, for one and the same U˜. Let F : U˜ −→ Pc/  be the function u˜ → [P(u˜)]. We denote by P(X˜) the random
variable F(X˜).
In essence, the above deﬁnition tells us how to "plug" a random variable X into an open process P(x) thus obtaining a new
random variable P(X). Note that this deﬁnition does not involve anything like textual replacement of x by X inside P(x). What
we do is simply taking the function F : U → Pc/ , deﬁned as F(u) = [P(u)] for each u, and composing it with the random
variable X seen as a function. Doing so, we obtain a new random variable F ◦ X , written P(X), that has Pc/  as a state space
– that is, the outcomes of P(X) are -equivalence classes. The semantical aspects of the deﬁnition are subsumed by . The
deﬁnition itself is parametric1 with the actual choice of : different choices for  may correspond to different assumptions
on the observational power of the attacker. We shall elaborate on this point in Section 5.2.
The next example is very simple and only serves to convey some intuition about the above deﬁnition.
Example 4.1 (pin-checking). A pin-checking process can be deﬁned as follows. Here, x, z : 1..k for some integer k and x
represents the secret code. The situation is modeled where an observer can freely interact with the checking process.
Check(x)
def= a(z).([z = x]ok.Check(x) + [z /= x]no.Check(x)) . (4)
In this case, the range of the function F : u → [Check(u)] mentioned in Deﬁnition 4.1 has k distinct elements, as u /= u′
implies Check(u)  Check(u′): for instance, Check(u) has the trace au · ok, which Check(u′) has not. As a consequence, for a r.v.
X : 1..k, the distribution of P(X) mirrors exactly that of X . E.g., if X is uniformly distributed on 1..k, then Z = P(X) is u.d. over
{[Check(1)], ..., [Check(k)]}, i.e. the probability of each outcome of Z is 1/k.
In the sequel, the following two facts will turn out to be useful. First, from Deﬁnition 4.1, it is immediate to see that the
distribution of P(X˜) is given by the following, for each o = [Q ]:
Pr
(
P(X˜) = o
)
=
∑
u˜: P(u˜)Q
Pr
(
X˜ = u˜
)
(5)
Second, note that, if P(u˜)  Q (u˜) for each u˜, then, for any X˜ , P(X˜) and Q (X˜) are the same random variable.
5. Absolute leakage
Throughout the section and unless otherwise stated, we let P(x˜, y˜) be an arbitrary open process, with x˜ : U˜ and y˜ : V˜ , while
X˜ : U˜ and Y˜ : V˜ are two vectors of random variables, and Z = P(X˜ , Y˜).
5.1. Deﬁnitions and basic properties
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Absolute leakage). Let P(x˜, y˜) be an open process, X˜ and Y˜ be r.v. and let Z = P(X˜ , Y˜). The (absolute) information
leakage from X˜ to P given Y˜ is deﬁned as:
A(P; X˜ | Y˜) def= I(X˜; Z | Y˜) = H(X˜|Y˜) − H(X˜ | Y˜ , Z) .
When Y˜ is empty, we simply write absolute leakage as A(P; X˜). A ﬁrst useful fact on the deﬁnition above is that leakage
is nothing but the uncertainty about P(X˜ , Y˜) after observing Y˜ .
Lemma 5.1. Let P(x˜, y˜) be an open process, X˜ and Y˜ be r.v. and let Z = P(X˜ , Y˜). Then A(P; X˜ | Y˜) = H(Z | Y˜). In particular, if y˜ is
empty, A(P; X˜) = H(Z).
Proof. This is a simple application of the chain rule (2). By symmetry of mutual information I, we have A(P; X˜ | Y˜)
= I(X˜; Z | Y˜) = H(Z | Y˜) − H(Z | X˜ , Y˜). But Z = P(X˜ , Y˜) is a function of X˜ and Y˜ , hence H(Z | X˜ , Y˜) = 0. 
Example 5.1 (pin-checking). The process Check(x) deﬁned in (4) leaks all information about x. For example, if X is u.d on 1..k
then Z = P(X) is u.d. over a set of k outcomes. Hence, using Lemma 5.1, A(Check;X) = H(Z) = log k = H(X).
Suppose now the adversary cannot interact freely with Check, rather he can observe the outcome of a user’s interacting
oncewithCheck. The adversaryknows the codey triedby theuser.We represent theuser simply asay, hence thenewsystem is
OneTry(x, y)
def= (νa)(Check(x)|ay) . (6)
1 Strictly speaking, we should make the dependency of P(X˜) from  explicit by writing e.g. P(X˜), but we shall omit to do so unless strictly necessary.
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Clearly, for any r.v. X ,Y : 1..k, the random variable Z = OneTry(X ,Y) has only two possible outcomes, that is [τ.ok] and
[τ.no]. These outcomes have probabilities Pr(X = Y) and Pr(X /= Y), respectively. In the case where X and Y are uniformly
distributedand independent, theseprobabilities are1/k and1− 1/k, respectively.Weare interested inA(OneTry; X | Y). Easy
calculations show that Z and Y are independent: indeed, for o = [τ.ok] and any i ∈ 1..k, Pr(Z = o | Y = i) = Pr(X = i) = 1k ,
while Pr(Z = o) = Pr(X = Y) = 1
k
, and similarly for o = [τ.no], that is Pr(Z = o | Y = i) = Pr(Z = o). For the sake of
concreteness, let us assume k = 10. Using Lemma 5.1 we can compute absolute leakage as
A(OneTry;X | Y) = H(Z | Y) = H(Z) = B
(
1
10
)
≈ 0.469 .
In this case, knowledge of Y brings no advantage to the adversary.
Example 5.2 (A mobile object). Consider an object that can freely move within a grid of coordinates k × k, starting from a
secret location at coordinate (x1, x2) (x1 row, x2 column). For some reason, only the directions (w, e,n, s) of the object’s moves
are observable. Considering x1, x2 : 1, ..., k, we have (please note that "+" denotes nondeterministic choice below):
Mobile(x1, x2)
def= [x1 > 1]w.Mobile(x1 − 1, x2) + [x1 < k]e.Mobile(x1 + 1, x2)
+ [x2 < k]n.Mobile(x1, x2 + 1) + [x2 > 1]s.Mobile(x1, x2 − 1) .
(7)
The "game" here is the adversary’s guessing the secret location by only observing the sequence of movement directions.
Note that (u1,u2) /= (u′1,u′2) implies Mobile(u1,u2)  Mobile(u′1,u′2). Hence, for any two random variables X1,X2 : 1..k, Z =
Mobile(X1,X2) is a random variable whose distribution mirrors that of (X1,X2). Hence in this case there is a total leakage of
information. E.g., if X1 and X2 are uniformly distributed and independent, then, by (3),A(Mobile ; X1,X2) = H(Z) = H(X ,Y) =
2 · log k. Suppose a "confounder" process C def= w.C + e.C is inserted into the system, that is, consider the system Mobile|C
(note that no synchronization can take place between Mobile and C, their actions are merely interleaved). The presence
of confounder makes two objects lying in the same row indistinguishable: Mobile(u, v)|C  Mobile(u′, v′)|C iff u = u′. As a
consequence, the information conveyed by the new system is halved: A(Mobile|C ; X1,X2) = log k.
The next result asserts that absolute leakage is compositional, in the following sense: the amount of information leaked
by a global system cannot exceed the overall information leaked by individual sub-systems observed in isolation. There is
a technical condition on the the side information, as Y˜ must be decomposable into independent pieces, each of which is
related only to a single sub-system (at the moment, we do not know whether this condition can be relaxed). The proof of
the result is a consequence of inequality (3) and of (an instance of) the so called "data processing" inequality [13]. The latter
implies that for any r.v.W and function F of appropriate domain, H(F(W)) ≤ H(W).
Fix a sequence of distinct process variables (placeholders for processes) X1,X2, .... Recall that a (n-holes) context is a
process term containing at least one occurrence of process variableXi, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n (theXi represents the "holes"). We
write C[·, ..., ·] for a generic context and C[P1, ..., Pn] for the process obtained by replacingX1,X2, ...with P1, P2, .... We say that
C[·, ..., ·] preserves  if whenever Pi  P′i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n then C[P1, ..., Pn]  C[P′1, ..., P′n].
Proposition 5.1 (Compositionality). Let C[·, ..., ·] be a n-holes context that preserves , and let Qi(x˜, y˜i) be open processes,
1 ≤ i ≤ n,where y˜ = (y˜1, ..., y˜n). Let P(x˜, y˜) = C[Q1(x˜, y˜1), ...,Qn(x˜, y˜n)]. Let Y˜ = (Y˜1, ..., Y˜n),with the Y˜i’s pairwise independent. Let
L = A(P; X˜ | Y˜) and Li = A(Qi; X˜ | Y˜i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then
L ≤
n∑
i=1
Li . (8)
Proof. Let G : (Pc / )n → Pc/  be the function deﬁned by ([P1], ..., [Pn]) →
[
C[P1, ..., Pn]
]
 (note that this is well-
deﬁned since C[·] is -preserving). For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Zi = Qi(X˜ , Y˜i). Then P(X˜ , Y˜) = G(Z1, ..., Zn). Therefore A(P; X˜ | Y˜)
can be written as H
(
G(Z1, ..., Zn), Y˜
)
− H(Y˜). By the data-processing inequality and independence of the Y˜i, the last
term is ≤ H(Z1, ..., Zn, Y˜1, ..., Y˜n) −
∑
i=1,...,n H(Y˜i). By inequality (3), the last term is in turn ≤
∑
i=1,...,n H(Zi, Y˜i) − H(Y˜i) =∑
i=1,...,n H(Zi | Y˜i) =
∑
i=1,...,n A(Qi; X˜ | Y˜i). 
In the caseof parallel composition, the inequality (8) specializes toA(P|Q ; X˜ | Y˜) ≤A(P ; X˜ | Y˜1) + A(Q ; X˜ | Y˜2).Moreover,
(8) implies that leakage is never increased by unary operators preserving . In the case of replication ! this leads to the
somewhat unexpected conclusion, which holds provided  is preserved by !
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A(!P ; X˜ | Y˜) ≤ A(P ; X˜ | Y˜) .
The intuitionunderlying the above inequality canbe explainedunder the assumptions informally discussed the Introduction:
once the attacker is given P, he/she can produce as many copies of P as desired and possibly run them in parallel, thus
simulating !P if necessary, while the converse is not in general possible (i.e., given !P it is not possible in general to simulate P;
see also Example 5.3 below). In general, instances of inequality (8)may hold strict or not, as shown by the following example.
Example 5.3. Consider P(x) = ([x = 0]a)|a, where x : {0, 1}, andX is u.d. on the same set. Then1 = A(P;X) > A(!P;X) = 0. The
reason for the last equality is that for v ∈ {0, 1}, !P(v) !a, that is, the behaviour of !P(x) does not depend on x, so H(P(X)) = 0.
On the other hand, consider P1(x) = [x = 2]a + [x = 4]a and P2(x) = [x = 1]b + [x = 2]b, where this time x : 1..4, and X
is u.d. on the same set. Then A(P1|P2 ; X) = A(P1 ; X) + A(P2 ; X) = B( 12 ) + B( 12 ) = 2.
Our next task is to investigate the situation of zero leakage. We start from Abadi and Gordon’ deﬁnition of Secrecy [1].
According to this deﬁnition, a process P(x˜) keeps x˜ secret if the observable behaviour of P(x˜) does not depend on the actual
values x˜may take on. Partly motivated by the non-interference scenario [17,16,34], where variables are classiﬁed into "low"
and "high", we ﬁnd it natural to generalize the deﬁnition of [1] to the case where the behaviour of P may also depend on
further parameters y˜ known to the adversary.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Generalized secrecy).We say that P(x˜, y˜) keeps x˜ secret given y˜ if, for each v˜ ∈ V˜ , and for each u˜ ∈ U˜ and u˜′ ∈ U˜,
it holds that P(u˜, v˜)  P(u˜′, v˜).
The main result of the section states agreement of diverse notions of secrecy: functional (deﬁnition above), quantitative
(zero leakage) and logical (independence of mgb’s from x˜). The last deﬁnition appears to be more amenable to automatic
checking, because, as mentioned, a mgb can be effectively computed in many cases. We also offer an "optimized" version of
the quantitative notion, by which it is sufﬁcient to check zero-leakage relatively to uniformly distributed and independent
X˜ and Y˜ .
Theorem 5.1 (Secrecy). Let P(x˜, y˜) be an open process. The following assertions are equivalent:
1. P(x˜, y˜) keeps x˜ secret given y˜.
2. For some X˜* : U˜ and Y˜* : V˜ uniformly distributed and independent A(P ; X˜* | Y˜*) = 0.
3. max
X˜:U˜, Y˜ :V˜ A(P ; X˜ | Y˜) = 0.
4. φ ⇔ ∃x˜x˜′.φ, where φ = mgb
(
P(x˜, y˜), P(x˜′, y˜′)
)
, for x˜′ and y˜′ tuples of distinct variables disjoint from x˜ and y˜, but of the same
type.
Proof. We show that (4) ⇒ (3) ⇒ (2) ⇒ (1) ⇒ (4). In what follows, for ease of notation, we will denote by u˜, u˜′, ... generic
outcomes of X˜ , by v˜, v˜′, ... generic outcomes of Y˜ and byw,w′, ... generic outcomes of Z = P(X˜ , Y˜). Moreover we shall use such
shorthands as p(u˜) for Pr(X˜ = u˜), p(w | u˜) for Pr(Z = w | X˜ = u˜), and so on.
• (4) ⇒ (3). By contradiction, assume for some X˜ and Y˜ it holds A(P; X˜ | Y˜) = H(Z | Y˜) > 0. By deﬁnition of H(Z | Y˜), this
implies that there is some v˜ such thatH(Z | Y˜ = v˜) > 0. The latter, by deﬁnition of conditional entropy, implies that there
are at least two distinct outcomes of Z corresponding to v˜, say w1 = [P(u˜1, v˜)] and w2 = [P(u˜2, v˜)] (and it also implies
that 1 > p(wi | v˜) > 0, for i = 1, 2). That is, P(u˜1, v˜)  P(u˜2, v˜). Now, consider the substitution σ = [u˜1/˜x, u˜2/˜x′, v˜/˜y, v˜/˜y′]. By
deﬁnition of the mgb φ, we have that σ |= ∃x˜x˜′.φ (that is, φσ is a tautology), while σ |= φ: this contradicts φ ⇔ ∃x˜x˜′.φ.
• (3) ⇒ (2). Obvious.
• (2) ⇒ (1). By contradiction, assume P(x˜, y˜) does not keep x˜ secret given y˜. In other words, assume there are v˜ and distinct
u˜1, u˜2 such that P(u˜1, v˜)  P(u˜2, v˜). Let wi = [P(u˜i, v˜)], for i = 1, 2. By independence and uniform distribution of X˜* and
Y˜*, we have that, for both i = 1, 2:
p(wi | v˜) =
∑
u˜:U˜
p(wi | u˜, v˜) · p(u˜) ≥ p(wi | u˜i, v˜) · p(u˜i) = p(u˜i) > 0
(in the rightmost equality abovewehave used the fact that p(wi | u˜i, v˜) = 1). This inequality also implies that p(wi | v˜) < 1,
for i = 1, 2. Thus we have shown that 0 < p(wi | v˜) < 1, for i = 1, 2. By deﬁnition of conditional entropy, this implies that
H(Z | Y˜ = v˜) > 0, hence H(Z | Y˜) > 0, as p(v˜) > 0. This fact contradicts the assumption that A(P; X˜ | Y˜) = 0.
• (1) ⇒ (4). By contradiction, assume (4) does not hold. Hence it must be ∃x˜x˜′.φ ⇒ φ, as the opposite logical implication
always holds. This means that there is a substitution σ with dom(σ ) ⊇ fv(φ) s.t. σ |= ∃x˜x˜′.φ and σ |= φ. Let u˜ = σ(x˜) and
u˜′ = σ(x˜′), and v˜ = σ(y˜). Then, by deﬁnition of mgb, P(u˜, v˜)  P(u˜′, v˜), which contradicts the assumption. 
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Example 5.4. Consider the following process, where x, y : 1..4.
Q (x, y)
def= (νc)
(
c | [y = 1]c.a
)
+ [x = 2]τ.a .
It is immediate to see that Q does not keep x secret, given y. E.g., if the adversary gets to know that y /= 1 and observes the
behaviour [τ.a] then he/she can infer that x = 2. In fact, the mgb given by the theorem above is in this case
φ =
(
[y = 1] ∨ [x = 2]
)
↔
(
[y′ = 1] ∨ [x′ = 2]
)
and clearly, φ ⇔ ∃xx′.φ. As an example, for X ,Y independent and u.d on 1..4, the leakage from X toQ given Y can be computed
as follows. Let Z = P(X ,Y).
• If Y = 1 then Z does not depend on X , as for all i and j: Q (i, 1)  Q (j, 1)  τ.a. Hence H(Z | Y = 1) = 0;
• If Y = i /= 1 then if X = 2 (which happens with probability 1
4
) then Z = [τ.a], otherwise Z = [0]. Hence H(Z | Y = i) =
B( 1
4
), for i /= 1.
As a consequence
H(Z | Y) =
4∑
i=1
H(Z | Y = i) · Pr(Y = i) = B
(
1
4
)
· 3
4
≈ 0.608.
The process Q ′(x, y) = Q (x, y) + [y /= 1]τ.a keeps x secret given y.
The next example shows a simple form of timing-dependent leakage.
Example 5.5 (Modular exponentiation). The modular exponentiation algorithm, used in implementations of public-key
cryptographic schemes for computing powers ax mod n, can be described as follows. Let x˜ = (xk−1, ..., x0) be the binary
representation of a (secret) k-bit exponent x and A an integer variable initially storing 1. The ﬁnal value of A is that returned
by the algorithm:
E(x˜)
def= for i = k − 1 downto 0 do {A=A2 mod n ; if xi =1 then A=a *A mod n } .
We consider two different abstract versions of E, where just the elapse of time can be observed. The basic operations of E
are squaring A=A2 mod n and multiplication A=a *A mod n. Assume that an attacker can observe the duration of individual
executions of such operations (admittedly, a strong assumption). Assume further that there is a discrete range of durations,
hence it is possible to represent each duration as a distinct visible action. In the ﬁrst abstract version of E, we suppose that
the time taken by each operation is a constant t (below, for is just used as syntactic sugar):
E1(x˜)
def= for i = k − 1 downto 0 do (t.[xi = 1]t) .
In the second version, each squaring operation takes t1, and each multiplication t2:
E2(x˜)
def= for i = k − 1 downto 0 do (t1.[xi = 1]t2) .
It is easy to see that E1(u˜)  E1(v˜) if and only if u˜ and v˜ have the same number of 1 digits (the same Hamming weight), which
makes entropy easy to determine analytically if X˜ is u.d2. E.g. assuming k = 4, we get H(E1(X˜)) ≈ 2.03. Not surprisingly, E2
leaks all information about X˜ , as a t2 action at iteration number i is observed if and only if Xi = 1: hence H(E2(X˜)) = H(X˜).
Under the assumptions above (k = 4, X˜ u.d), this value is 4.
5.2. Behavioural equivalences and attacker’s observational power
To a large extent, our results on absolute leakage do not depend on the choice of the behavioural equivalence – contrary
to the case of rate of leakage, which we study in Section 7, where we will have to commit to trace equivalence. Even the
numeric values in the examples we have considered so far do not depend on the choice of, as trace equivalence and strong
bisimilarity, the two extremes in between which  is supposed to lie, coincide in those cases.
In general, however, choosing a speciﬁc equivalence amounts to assigning a speciﬁc observational power to the attacker:
the ﬁner (more discriminating) the equivalence, the stronger the observational power of the attacker, that is, his/her ability
2 More precisely, E1(X˜) has k + 1 possible outcomes; the outcome corresponding to an exponent X with i "1" digits has probability pi = (
k
i)
2k
, for i ∈ 0..k.
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to tell apart different behaviours induced by different outcomes of X . This is the content of the next proposition. In what
follows, for notational simplicity, we consider individual r.v.’s X and Y rather than vectors of them. We shall indicate by Ai
the leakage function computed when  is set to the equivalence i. Similarly, we indicate by Pi (X;Y) the r.v. induced by P,
X and Y when setting  to i.
Proposition 5.2. Let 1 and 2 be two behavioural equivalences over closed processes and suppose 1 ⊆2 . Let P(x, y) be an
open process and X ,Y be r.v. Then A1 (P ; X | Y) ≥ A2 (P ; X | Y).
Proof. Let U be the set of outcomes of X . For generic total functions f and g deﬁned over U, let us write
f ≤ g iff for each u and v, g(u) = g(v) implies f (u) = f (v).
Equivalently, f ≤ g iff for each u ∈ U there is a set V ⊆ U s.t. f−1(u) = ∪v∈V g−1(v). Note that if f ≤ g then g(u) determines
f (u): indeed, f maps any element of g−1(g(u)) to one and the same f (u). Now, for any two random variables R1 and R2, we
have the following equality, which is a consequence of the chain rule
H(R1) = H(R2) + H(R1 | R2) − H(R2 | R1) .
Applying the above equality to R1 = g(X) and R2 = f (X), we get thatH(g(X)) = H(f (X)) + H(g(X) | f (X)), asH(f (X) | g(X)) = 0:
indeed, the value of g(X) determines that of f (X). Hence, we have obtained that
f ≤ g implies H(g(X)) ≥ H(f (X)) .
Now, ﬁx any outcome v of Y and consider the functions g : u → [P(u, v)]1 and f : u → [P(u, v)]2 . Clearly f ≤ g. Applying the
inequality above, we get H(P1 (X , v)) ≥ H(P2 (X , v)). But H(Pi (X , v)) = H(Pi (X ,Y) | Y = v), for i = 1, 2, so we have actually
shown that
H(P1 (X ,Y) | Y = v) ≥ H(P2 (X ,Y) | Y = v) .
Averaging on all v’s, we get H(P1 (X ,Y) | Y) ≥ H(P2 (X ,Y) | Y), that is, by Lemma 5.1, A1 (P ; X | Y) ≥ A2 (P ; X | Y). 
We give below a simple example involving strong bisimulation ∼ and trace equivalence .
Example 5.6. Recall that  takes into account only sequences of (weak) traces: indeed, P  Q holds true if and only if for
each trace s, P
s⇒ iff Q s⇒. On the other hand, strong bisimilarity∼ takes into account the branching structure arising from
nondeterminism, and is more discriminating than trace equivalence. Speciﬁcally, ∼ is deﬁned as the largest equivalence
relation over closed processes such that whenever P ∼ Q and P μ−→ P′ then there is a transition Q μ−→ Q ′ such that P′ ∼ Q ′.
(Another difference between these two semantics is that trace equivalence is τ-abstracting while strong bisimilarity is not,
but this fact is not going to play a role in the example below.) Consider now
P(x)
def= a.b + [x = 0]a
where x : 0..1. Take X u.d. on 0..1. Let us set  to testing equivalence . What is A(P ; X)? Clearly, P(0)  P(1)  a.b, thus the
function i → [P(i)], for i = 0, 1, is a constant and A(P ; X) = H
(
P(X)
)
= 0. Let us now set  to ∼. It is immediate to check
that P(0) ∼ P(1): indeed, P(0) a−→ 0, a move that P(1) cannot simulate. As a consequence, in this case P(X) takes two distinct
values, [P(0)]∼ and [P(1)]∼, each with probability 12 . Hence, A(P ; X) = H
(
P(X)
)
= 1.
6. Absolute leakage in relation to other security measures
The use of entropy as a measure of uncertainty in Cryptography dates back to Shannon [30]. The relationship of Shannon
entropy to "guessing difﬁculty" is also somehow folklore: the higher the entropy, themore difﬁcult for an attacker to correctly
guess, say, a secret key (see [3]). Although the coincidence of entropy and guessing difﬁculty has been questioned (see e.g.
[27]), there is no doubt that these two notions are intimately connected, as witnessed by certain results in Information
Theory. Below, we review these results and use them to relate absolute leakage to certain security measures that account for
either the error probability or the guessing effort of an attacker that tries to infer sensitive information from P.
Before examining those results closely, though, it is important to stress one general reasonwhy Shannon’s entropymay be
(and in fact is) preferred to other, more direct metrics of guessing difﬁculty. This reason lies in the nice additivity properties
of entropy, as expressed by the chain rule. In this respect, an instance of the chain rule called grouping law is illuminating.
The grouping law states that given any partition U1, ...,Un of the state-space U of X , the uncertainty on X can be decomposed
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into the uncertainty as to what block of the partition X belongs to, plus the uncertainty on which element of that block X is.
Formally, once we deﬁne the r.v. Y = i iff X ∈ Ui, we have that3
H(X) = H(Y) + H(X | Y) . (9)
In our model, laws of this kind make it possible to establish forms of compositional reasoning, as discussed in the preceding
section. As a direct example of application of (9) to our model, consider the following. It is easy to show that (for any
instantiation of x) P(x) can be re-written modulo  into a head-normal form ∑ni=1 φiPi(x), with the property that the φi’s
form a partition of truth (that is, φi ∧ φj ⇒ false for i /= j, and
∨n
i=1 φ ⇔ true; see e.g. [6]). Assume that the partition over the
data determined by the function u → [P(u)] is ﬁner than the partition determined by the φi’s (that is, for each [P(u)] there
is a φj s.t. ∀v, P(v)  P(u) implies φ(v)). Deﬁne the r.v. Y as Y = i iff φi(X) = true. This way, each outcome i of Y determines a
set of possible equivalence classes [P(u)]. Then, by (9), we get (we let pi = Pr(Y = i))
H
(
P(X˜)
)
= H(Y) + H
(
P(X) | Y
)
= H(p˜) +
n∑
i=1
piH
(
Pi(X | Y = i)
)
by which the problem of computing the entropy of P(X) is reduced to the problem of computing the probabilities pi’s (which
are easy to estimate accurately) and the conditional entropy of the subterms Pi(X | Y = i). It is worth to stress that similar
additivity properties are not found in connection to other, reasonable security measures, such as those considered below
(see [27] for a discussion).
In what follows, for notational simplicity, we shall consider a single r.v. X , rather than a vector, and assume that no
side-information Y is available.
6.1. Error probability
Generally speaking, given a r.v. X with outcomes inU and an r.v. Z with outcomes in V , one can deﬁne the error probability
of inferring X from Z under an optimal "guessing function" g, thus
εX ,Z
def= inf
g:V→U
Pr(g(Z) /= X) .
It can be shown that the above inf is in fact a minimum, attained when g fulﬁlls theMaximum a Posteriori Probability (MAP)
rule. This rule dictates that, for each possible outcome v of Z , u = g(v) should maximize Pr(X = u | Z = v). Fano’s inequality
[13] sets a lower bound on εX ,Z in terms of the uncertainty on X after observing Z , that is H(X | Z):
εX ,Z ≥ H(X | Z) − 1
log |X| . (10)
As expected, the higher the uncertainty, the higher the error probability. It is then immediate to convert upper bounds
on absolute leakage into lower bounds on the attacker’s error probability of guessing X after observing Z . Let Z = P(X). By
deﬁnition of leakage as mutual information between X and Z , we have that H(X | Z) = H(X) − A(P ; X) = H(X) − H(Z). This
expression can be plugged into formula (10), which can then be used to lower-bound εX ,Z in terms of absolute leakage.
For instance, in the case of the modular exponentiation algorithm with an exponent of k = 4 bits chosen at random
(Example 5.5), which exhibits an absolute leakage of 2.03 bits, one gets εX ,Z ≥ (4− 2.03− 1)/2 ≈ 0.485.
It is worth to notice that inequalities are also known that give tight upper bounds on error probability as a function of the
conditional entropy (see e.g. [9] for a survey and recent results on upper bounds).
6.2. Guesswork
Consider now a slightly different situation. The attacker is given an oracle that answers (multiple) queries of the form
"X = u?". In the absence of any extra information on X , the most effective strategy for the attacker is to submit to the oracle
guesses for X , from the most likely down to the least likely, stopping as soon as a "yes" answer is received (this is what is
called a dictionary attack in password security). Let p˜ = p1, ..., pn be the distribution of X , with the probabilities pi’s ordered
from the greatest to the smallest. The average number of queries before correctly guessing X , the guesswork of X , is deﬁned
by
G(X)
def=
n∑
i=1
ipi
3 To see that this equation is a consequence of the chain rule, note that, by the chain rule, for any X and Y ,H(X) = H(Y) + H(X|Y) − H(Y |X). If Y is a function
of X , like in the case considered here, H(Y |X) = 0.
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and can be taken as a security measure relative to X . When X is u.d., there is a clear relationship between Shannon and
guesswork, given by G(X) = n+1
2
= 2H(X)+1
2
. More generally, Massey [25] has proven that, if X has at least 2 bits of entropy:
G(X) ≥ 2
H(X) + 1
e
. (11)
Consider now equipping the adversary of our model with the oracle described above. Assume in full generality that
Z = F(X) for some function F (in ourmodel, F : u → [P(u)]). The attacker can take advantage of both the oracle and Z: rather
than querying the oracle blindly, he/she can restrict his/her search to those values of X that are consistent with the observed
value of Z . If Z = v, only those u ∈ F−1(v) are worth to be submitted to the oracle. Measuring the security of this system
calls then for a conditional deﬁnition of guesswork, G(X | Z). The guesswork of X given Z = v, written G(X | v), is just the
guesswork of the conditional distribution (using a concise notation) pX|Z (u1 | v), ..., pX|Z (um | v), while the guesswork of X
given Z can be deﬁned as the average
G(X | Z) def=
∑
v
G(X | v)pZ (v)
which we can take as a security measure. We can express a lower bound on this quantity in terms of the absolute leakage
H(Z) = A(P ; X), as follows:
G(X | Z) =∑v G(X|v)pZ (v)
≥∑v pZ (v)(2H(X|v) + 1)/e by (11)
= (1+∑v 2H(X|v)pZ (v))/e
≥ (1+ 2
∑
v H(X|v)pZ (v))/e by Jensen’s inequality [13]
= (1+ 2H(X|Z))/e
= (1+ 2H(X)−H(Z))/e .
(when applying Jensen’s inequality above we have exploited the convexity of the function 2x). The above inequality can be
used to convert upper bounds on absolute leakage into lower bounds on conditional guesswork. For instance, in the case
of the modular exponentiation algorithm with an exponent X of k = 4 bits chosen at random (Example 5.5), which exhibits
an absolute leakage of 2.03, one gets G(X | Z) ≥ 24−2.03+1e ≈ 1.81. This value should be compared with the value of a priori
guesswork for X , G(X) = 8.5.
7. Rate of leakage
In the scenario considered in the previous section, the attacker is granted unrestricted interaction capability to the
observed process P. The pin-checking example suggests a reﬁnement of this situation, that we study in this section. We will
assume the attacker can only conduct upon P repeated experiments, each yielding a binary4 answer, say success or failure.
We are interested in the number of communicationswith the observed process that are necessary for the adversary to extract
one bit of information about X˜ in this way. In other words, we are interested in themaximal number of bits per visible action
conveyed by P: the rate at which P leaks information.
In the rest of the section, we ﬁx  to be trace equivalence (akamay testing equivalence [14,5]), whose deﬁnition we recall
below for the reader’s convenience.
Deﬁnition 7.1 (Trace equivalence). P  Q iff for each trace s, P s⇒ iff Q s⇒.
For the sake of presentation, we shall only consider processes where channels transport tuples of values, i.e. we ban
name-passing in the rest of the section. The extension to the name-passing case is dealt with in Appendix 9. For simplicity,
we shall also assume that no side-information is available to the attacker, i.e. that y˜ is empty. Hence, throughout the section
andunless otherwise stated, P(x˜), where x˜ : U˜, denotes an arbitrary open pi-process, X˜ an arbitrary vector of randomvariables
of type U˜ and Z the r.v. P(X˜). Recall that A(P ; X˜) = H(Z).
4 We expect no signiﬁcant change in the theory if k-ary answers, with k > 2 ﬁxed, were instead considered.
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7.1. Deﬁnitions and basic properties
Consistently with the testing equivalence framework [14,5], we view an experiment as a test process T that, when run in
parallel with P, may succeed or not. Input on a distinct name ω, carrying no objects, is used to signal success to the adversary.
It is convenient here to adjust the notion of (test-process) composition (‖) so as to ensure that, in case of success, exactly one
success action is reported to the adversary.
Deﬁnition 7.2 (Test processes and composition). A test T is a closed process formed without using process identiﬁers and
possibly using a distinct success action ω. For each test T and closed process Q , deﬁne
Q‖T def= (νc˜,ω′)(Q |T [ω′/ω]|ω′.ω)
where c˜ = fn(Q , T) \ {ω} and ω′ /∈ fn(Q ,ω).
Note that, for each T and closed Q , it must be either Q‖T  0 – meaning that T fails on Q – or Q‖T  ω.0 – meaning that
T succeeds on Q . Hence, each P(x˜) , T and X˜ determine a binary random variable
(P‖T)(X˜)
also written P(X˜)‖T , with possible outcomes F def= [0] and S def= [ω.0], to be interpreted as failure and success. Information
on X˜ conveyed by P(X˜)||T is given by
I
(
X˜ ; P(X˜)‖T
)
= H
(
P(X˜)‖T
)
− H
(
P(X˜)‖T | X˜
)
= H
(
P(X˜)‖T
)
and is, of course, at most one bit. The notion of rate we are after should involve a ratio between this quantity of information
and the cost of performing the test T . The following example provides some indications as to what it should be intended by
cost, and shows the role played by non-determinism in extracting information out of P.
Example 7.1. Consider again Check(X), where this time X is u.d. over 1..k, for some ﬁxed even integer k ≥ 2. A test T that
extracts one bit out of Check(X) is
T
def=
k/2∑
d=1
ad.ok.ω .
An attacker can only observe the outcome of the interaction between Check and T , i.e. an outcome of the r.v. Check(X)‖T . If
action ω is observed, then it must be X ≤ k/2; if action ω is not observed, then it must be X > k/2. The information provided
by T is I(X ; P(X)||T) = H(P(X)||T) = B( 1
2
) = 1.
The above example suggests that the test’s traces that may lead to success, that is traces ending with a ω, should be
counted as the different "trials" attempted by the attacker. The success or failure of each trial gives the attacker some amount
of information. The cost of each trial can be assumed to be proportional to its length as a trace. These considerationsmotivate
the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 7.3 (Cost of T). Let T be a test. We say that a nonempty trace of visible actions s = α1 · · ·αn (αi /= ω)may lead T to
success if T
s·ω⇒ . Denote by |s| the length of a trace s. The cost of T is
|T | def=
∑
s : smay lead T to success
|s| .
According to the deﬁnition above, all traces that have a chance of leading T to success, when T is run with some P, must
be counted – only "dummy" traces, never leading to ω, are discarded. Consider e.g. T = a.b.ω + c.d + e.ω: we have |T | = 3,
as the dummy trace c · d is discarded, while e and a.b are counted. When composing T with P(x) = [x = 0]a.b, e cannot be
used to lead P‖T to success, while a · b leads to success only in case x = 0. In other words, while excluding dummy traces,
our deﬁnition of cost does include traces corresponding to failed attempts, as they give some information to the attacker.
We arrive now at the deﬁnition of leakage rate.
Deﬁnition 7.4 (Rate of leakage). Let P(x˜) be an open process and X˜ be a tuple of r.v. The leakage rate of P relative to X˜ is
R(P ; X˜) def= sup
|T |>0
H
(
P(X˜)‖T
)
|T | . (12)
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Our ﬁrst result is a test-independent characterization of rate. In accordance with the may-testing approach, this charac-
terization is obtained in terms of observations of individual traces of processes. The practical signiﬁcance of this result is
that, when computing rate of P, we are relieved from checking P against every T , and just have to look at P’s traces (which
are ﬁnitely many, if P is ﬁnite). In what follows, given a trace of visible actions s, we consider the r.v. P(X˜)
s⇒, with possible
outcomes true or false. As an example, if P(x) = a.[x = 0]a.0 and X is u.d. on {0, 1}, then Pr
(
P(X)
aa⇒ = true
)
= Pr(X = 0) = 1
2
.
We shall make extensive use of the fact that both | and ‖ distribute over nondeterministic choice, that is, for any closed Q , R1
and R2 we have
Q | (R1 + R2)  (Q |R1) + (Q |R2)
and similarly for ‖. This property does not hold, in general, for behavioural equivalences different from  (e.g., it does not
hold for bisimulation).
Proposition 7.1. Let P(x˜) be an open process and X˜ be a tuple of r.v. It holds that
R(P ; X˜) = sup
|s|>0
H
(
P(X˜)
s⇒
)
|s| . (13)
Proof. For any trace s, let sˆ be a test of cost |s| such that for each closed Q , Q‖sˆ ω⇒ iff Q s⇒ (see Appendix 9, where sˆ is
deﬁned in the case of the pi-calculus). Hence, P(X˜)
s⇒ is equivalent to P(X˜)‖sˆ as a r.v. This fact implies that the rhs of (13)
is not greater than the lhs. For the opposite inequality, ﬁx any T with |T | > 0 and let S be the set of traces that may lead T
to success. For any s, denote by s the complementary trace obtained by inverting input and output (e.g., if s = ad · bd′ then
s = ad · bd′). By simple -preserving transformations (see also Appendix 9), we can show that, for any closed Q :
Q‖T  Q‖
∑
s∈S
sˆ 
∑
s∈S
(Q‖sˆ) .
Hence P(X˜)‖T is equivalent to∑s∈S(P(X˜)‖sˆ) as a r.v. Using this fact and the inequality of Proposition 5.1 with C[·] =∑s∈S([·]),
we have that
H
(
P(X˜)||T
)
|T | =
H
( ∑
s∈S P(X˜)‖sˆ
)
|T | ≤
∑
s∈S H(P(X˜)‖sˆ)
|T | .
In the last term, we can replace P(X˜)‖sˆ by P(X˜) s⇒, hence H(P(X˜)‖sˆ) by H(P(X˜) s⇒). Moreover, by deﬁnition of cost, we can
replace |T | by∑s∈S |s| =∑s∈S |s|. The thesis then follows by the inequality below (which holds for genericMi > 0, Ni ≥ 0, for
i = 1, ..., k):
N1 + · · · + Nk
M1 + · · · +Mk
≤ max
i=1,...,k
Ni
Mi
.  (14)
Example 7.2. Consider the process CheckOnce(x)
def= a(z).([z = x]ok + [z /= x]no), where x, z : 1..10, and X u.d. on the same
interval. It is immediate to check that the ratio in (13) is maximized by any of s = ad · ok or s = ad · no, for d ∈ 1..10. This
yields R(CheckOnce ; X) = B( 1
10
)/2 ≈ 0.234.
Remark 7.1. The proposition above allows one, at least in principle, to compute the rate of any process having a ﬁnite
symbolic transition system. This can be seen as follows.
Let P(x˜) be one such process. Relying on P’s symbolic transition system, it is possible to compute, for any given trace s,
a logical formula φs(x˜) expressing the exact condition on x˜ under which P(x˜) can perform s (we will not discuss the details
here – see [19,6]).
By considering all possible traces in this way, one gets a ﬁnite set of formulae {φ1(x˜), ...,φk(x˜)}. The reason why this set
is ﬁnite is that any φs can be written as a disjunctive normal form using as atoms the formulae appearing in the symbolic
transition system of P(x˜), which is ﬁnite.
For each i = 1, ..., k, let si be the shortest trace associated with φi, and assume empty traces and tautologies are discarded
away. Note that for each trace si, the probability that P(X˜)
si⇒ holds true is simply Pr(φi(X˜) = true). Thus, R(P ; X˜) is the
greatest among the ratios H(φ1(X˜))|s1| ,...,
H(φk(X˜))|sk | . By statistical methods it is feasible to estimate the probabilities Pr(φi(X˜) = true),
even when it is difﬁcult to obtain explicit expressions for them (e.g., by estimating the fraction of true values obtained when
repeatedly evaluating φ(x˜) for values of x˜ drawn according to X˜).
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The next result explains the relationship between the notion of rate and absolute leakage. In particular, (a) establishes
that A is the maximal amount of information that can be extracted by repeated binary tests; and (b) provides a lower bound
on the cost necessary to extract this information, in terms of R – thus providing a justiﬁcation for the name "rate". Given a
ﬁnite sequence of tests T˜ = T (1), T (2), ..., T (n), we write |T˜ | for its cost |T (1)| + · · · + |T (n)|, and P(X˜)‖T˜ for the sequence of r.v.
P(X˜)‖T (1), ..., P(X˜)‖T (n).
Proposition 7.2. Let P(x˜) be an open process and X˜ be a tuple of r.v. It holds that
(a) A(P ; X˜) = max
T˜
I(X˜ ; P(X˜)‖T˜)
(b) for each T˜ , I(X˜ ; P(X˜)‖T˜) ≤ |T˜ | · R(P; X˜).
Proof.
(a) Let T˜ = T (1), ..., T (n) be a generic sequence of tests, and let P(X˜)||T˜ = P(X˜)||T (1), ..., P(X˜)||T (n) be the corresponding se-
quence of r.v. Let Z = P(X˜), hence A(P; X˜) = H(Z). By symmetry of I: I
(
X˜; P(X˜)||T˜
)
= H
(
P(X˜)||T˜
)
≤ H(Z), where the last
inequality stems from the data-processing inequality applied to the function G : [Q ] → ( [Q ||T (1)], ..., [Q ||T (n)] ).
We show that themax can be attained for a suitable choice of T˜ . By deﬁnition of, an outcome [Q ] of Z can be identiﬁed
with the set of traces L = {s |Q s⇒}, that is, the language generated by Q . For any two distinct outcomes of Z , say L and
L′, choose a trace s ∈ (L \ L′) ∪ (L′ \ L), and let D be the set of all such traces. Clearly, for any two outcomes of Z , say L
and L′, it holds that L = L′ if and only if D ∩ L = D ∩ L′. In other words Z and Z ∩ D are equivalent as r.v. We will deﬁne a
sequence of tests T˜ s.t. P(X˜)||T˜ is equivalent to Z ∩ D, which will prove the thesis, as H(P(X˜)||T˜) = H(Z) = A(P; X˜).
Let us arbitrarily order the elements of D as: s1, ..., sn. A vector in {0, 1}n can be identiﬁed with a subset of D in the
obvious way. For each si ∈ D, consider the test T (i) def= sˆi s.t. for any Q , Q‖sˆi ω⇒ iff Q si⇒. By identifying 0 with F = [0]
and 1 with S = [ω.0], we see that the r.v. P(X˜)||T˜ = P(X˜)||sˆ1, ..., P(X˜)||sˆn yields outcomes in {0, 1}n , i.e. on subsets of D.
Moreover, by deﬁnition of P(X˜)||T˜ , the event (P(X˜)||T˜ = L) is the same as the event (Z ∩ D = L). In other words, P(X˜)||T˜
and Z ∩ D are equivalent as r.v.
(b) Fix any T˜ , and assume without loss of generality that |T (i)| > 0 for each i. Then we have:
I(X˜; P(X˜)||T˜) = H(P(X˜)||T˜)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(P(X˜)||T (i)) (by (3))
= |T˜ | ·
∑n
i=1 H(P(X˜)||T (i))
|T˜ |
≤ |T˜ | ·maxi=1,...,n
H
(
P(X˜)||T (i)
)
|T (i)| (by (14))
≤ |T˜ | · R(P; X˜) .

Note that the cost of extracting all available information, A(P ; X˜) = H(Z), cannot be less than H(Z)
R(P;X˜) , for Z = P(X˜). It is
important to remark that two processeswith equal absolute leakagemaywell exhibit different rates. Here is a small example
to illustrate this point.
Example 7.3. Let P(x) and Q (x), where x : 0..3, be deﬁned as follows:
P(x) = [x = 0](a+ b) + [x = 1](b+ c) + [x = 2](c + d) + [x = 3](d + a)
Q (x) = [x = 0]a + [x = 1]b + [x = 2]c + [x = 3]d .
Assume X is u.d. over 0..3. Both P(X) and Q (X) are u.d. on a domain of four elements: the four distinct equivalence classes
[P(i)], resp. [Q (i)], for i ∈ 0..3. Hence their absolute leakage is H(P(X)) = H(Q (X)) = H(X) = 2 bits. On the other hand, each
nonempty trace of P occurs with probability 1/2 (i.e., Pr(P(X)
s⇒) = 1/2 for s ∈ {a, b, c, d}), while each nonempty trace of
Q occurs with probability 1/4 (i.e., Pr(Q (X)
s⇒) = 1/4 for s ∈ {a, b, c, d}). Thus, by Proposition 7.1, R(P;X) = B( 1
2
) = 1 and
R(Q ;X) = B( 1
4
) ≈ 0.811. Proposition 7.2(b) then implies that gaining all information about X costs an attacker at least 2
1
= 2
synchronizations in the case of P, and at least  2
0.811
 = 3 synchronizations in the case of Q . Indeed, the sequence of tests
a.ω, b.ω is sufﬁcient in the case of P for determining X . The sequence of tests a.ω, b.ω, c.ω is sufﬁcient in the case of Q .
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7.2. Compositionality
The results below are about composing rates of processes. The ﬁrst proposition gives upper bounds for the rate of a global
system in terms of the individual sub-systems. These inequalities can be used for compositional reasoning on rates, although
the bounds they provide are sometimes rather loose, especially in the case of restriction (νc). The proof of the proposition
is based on simple use of the data-processing inequality plus inequality (14). The subsequent Theorem 7.1 establishes that,
under certain conditions, iteration * preserves rate, thus providing another justiﬁcation for the deﬁnition of rate. We regard
this as the main result of the section.
Proposition 7.3. Let P(x˜) and Q (x˜) be open processes and X˜ be a vector of random variables of the same type as x˜. Let e˜(x˜) be a
tuple of expressions and let v˜ be the tuple of values that maximizes Pr(e˜(X˜) = v˜). Let φ(x˜) be a logical formula. Then the following
inequalities hold:
(i) R(a(z˜).P; X˜) ≤ maxu˜ R(P[u˜/˜z]; X˜)
(ii) R(ae˜.P; X˜) ≤ max {H([e˜(X˜) = v˜]), R(P; X˜)}
(iii) R(φ P; X˜) ≤ H(φ(X˜)) + R(P; X˜)
(iv) R((νa)P; X˜) ≤ R(P; X˜)
(v) R(P + Q ; X˜) ≤ R(P; X˜) + R(Q ; X˜) .
Proof.Weonly cover in detail the case (ii), as the other cases are routine applications of the data processing inequality and/or
of inequalities (1–3).
We rely on the trace-based characterization of R provided by Proposition 7.1. Let s be a generic nonempty trace and
ps = Pr
(
(ae˜.P)(X˜)
s⇒
)
.Will show thatB(ps)/|s| ≤ max {H([e˜(X˜) = v˜])), R(P; X˜)}. This is obvious if s is not of the form aw˜ · s′,
as in this case ps = 0 = B(ps). Thus, assume s = aw˜ · s′, for some w˜ and s′. First, note that, by symmetry of the binary entropy
function B(p) around the point p = 1/2 (see Fig. 1), the value v˜ that maximizes the probability Pr(e˜(X˜) = v˜) is also the value
that maximizes the entropy B(e˜(X˜) = v˜). Second, note that the r.v. (ae˜.P)(X˜) s⇒ is the same as (e˜(X˜) = w˜) ∧ P(X˜) s′⇒. From
these two facts, applying the data processing inequality and (3), we have:
B(ps) = H
(
(ae˜.P)(X˜)
s⇒
)
≤ H
(
e˜(X˜) = w˜ , P(X˜) s′⇒
)
≤ H
(
[e˜(X˜) = v˜]
)
+ H
(
P(X˜)
s′⇒
)
.
If s′ = ε then H
(
P(X˜)
s′⇒
)
= 0 (as P(X˜) ε⇒ holds with probability 1), and the thesis follows. Assume s′ /= ε. Dividing by
|s| = 1+ |s′| the inequality obtained above and then applying inequality (14), we have
B(ps)
|s| ≤
H([e˜(X˜) = v˜]) + H(P(X˜) s′⇒)
1+ |s′| ≤ max
{
H([e˜(X˜) = v˜]), H(P(X˜)
s′⇒)
|s′|
}
but H(P(X˜)
s′⇒ )
|s′ | ≤ R(P; X˜) by deﬁnition of rate. 
A notable omission from the previous proposition is the case of parallel composition P|Q . Interaction between P and Q
may give rise to short traces conveying much information on X . Indeed, synchronization may turn visible actions of P and Q
into invisible τ ’s. This might lead P|Q to exhibit a higher rate than the sum of P’s and Q ’s alone, as illustrated below.
Example 7.4. Consider P(x) = c.[x = 0]a, Q (x) = c with x : 0..1. Take X u.d. on 0..1. Clearly, P(X) has a rate of B( 1
2
)/2 = 1
2
,
while the rate of Q (X) is 0, as Q does not actually depend on x. When composing, however, we get for P|Q a rate of 1: indeed,
there is an interaction on c that makes trace a available if and only if x = 0. Hence Pr((P|Q )(X) a⇒) = 1
2
, which implies the
rate is 1.
In order to deﬁne iteration on processes, we have to ﬁrst deﬁne sequential composition. Output on a distinct name
stop, not carrying objects, is used to signal termination of a thread. We deﬁne sequential composition as P;Q def=
(ν stop′)(P[stop′/stop] | stop′.Q ) (with stop′ fresh). This means that the ﬁrst thread of P that terminates will trigger execution
of Q . This is slightly different from sequential composition in the usual sense, that would require termination of all threads
before activating Q . However, the two notions are equivalent in the context we are going to consider (see deﬁnition of
determinate process below). For any closed process P, let iteration * P be the process recursively deﬁned by * P
def= P; * P.
We show that, under a suitable condition, described below, the rate of * P is the same as P’s. The condition requires essen-
tially that termination of a single thread in a process is equivalent to termination of the whole process. Its role is that of
forbidding "hidden" interactions between threads belonging to different iterations of P in *P. We discuss its necessity below
(Remark 7.2).
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Fig. 1. Binary entropy function B(p) in [0, 1].
Deﬁnition 7.5 (Determinate processes). Let Q be a closed process. We say that a trace s is terminating for Q if Q
s·stop⇒ . We
say that Q is determinate if for every terminating trace s, whenever Q
s⇒ Q ′ then Q ′  stop. Finally, an open process P(x˜) is
determinate if
∑
u˜∈U˜ P(u˜) is determinate.
We need another technical condition: let us say that Q is stable if whenever Q
ε⇒ Q ′ (ε = empty trace) then Q ′  Q .
Theorem 7.1 (Iteration rate). Suppose that P(x˜) is determinate, and that for each u˜, P(u˜) is stable. Then R(*P ; X˜) = R(P ; X˜).
Proof.We show that for each nonempty s there exists a nonempty s′ s.t. H(* P(X˜) s⇒)/|s| ≤ H(P(X˜) s′⇒)/|s′|, that proves, by
Proposition 7.1, that R(*P ; X˜) ≤ R(P ; X˜). The proof of the opposite inequality is easier and omitted.
We proceed by induction on s. Suppose |s| > 0 and let T denote the set of terminating traces of S def= ∑
u˜∈U˜ P(u˜). There are
two cases for s.
(1) No trace in T is a preﬁx of s. In this case, it is easy to see that by deﬁnition of determinate process, for each u˜, * P(u˜)
s⇒
iff P(u˜)
s⇒, hence P(X˜) s⇒ is equivalent to *P(X˜) s⇒, and we can take s′ = s.
(2) There is s1 ∈ T that is a preﬁx of s, say s = s1 · s2 for some s2. We can assume that s1 is not empty (otherwise, S  stop,
and the thesis would follow trivially.) Note that, for each u˜, whenever * P(u˜)
s1⇒ P′ then necessarily P′  * P(u˜) (a
consequence of determinacy and stability of P(u˜)). Using this fact, one can prove that for each u˜,
* P(u˜)
s⇒ if and only if P(u˜) s1⇒ and * P(u˜) s2⇒ .
In other words, the r.v. * P(X˜)
s⇒ is the same as (P(X˜) s1⇒ ∧ *P(X˜) s2⇒). By virtue of the data-processing inequality and
by (3), we obtain
H
(
* P(X˜)
s⇒
)
≤ H
(
P(X˜)
s1⇒
)
+ H
(
* P(X˜)
s2⇒
)
.
Now, if s2 is empty, that is s=s1, the second termof the summationabove is0, hencedividingby |s|wehaveH(* P(X˜) s⇒)/
|s| ≤ H(P(X˜) s⇒)/|s|, and the thesis follows. Assume now that s2 is not empty. Dividing the above inequality again by
|s| = |s1| + |s2| and using (14), we get
H
(
* P(X˜)
s⇒
)
|s| ≤ max
⎧⎨
⎩
H
(
P(X˜)
s1⇒
)
|s1| ,
H
(
* P(X˜)
s2⇒
)
|s2|
⎫⎬
⎭.
If the max is the ﬁrst of the two terms, we set s′ = s1 and stop; otherwise, we invoke induction hypothesis on s2. 
Example 7.5. It is easy tocheck thatCheckOnceStop(x)
def= a(z).([z = x]ok.stop+ [z /= x]no.stop) isdeterminate (x : 1..10). Since
Check(d)  *CheckOnceStop(d), for every d, by Theorem 7.1 and Example 7.2 we have: R(Check ; X) = R(CheckOnceStop ; X)
= B( 1
10
)/2 ≈ 0.234.
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Remark 7.2 (On the necessity of the determinacy condition). In the absence of determinacy, neither (a)R(P ; X˜) ≤ R(*P ; X˜)nor
(b)R(*P ; X˜) ≤ R(P ; X˜) hold in general. As a counter-example to inequality (a), consider P(x) = [x = 0]a.stop+ [x = 1]a.a.stop
with x : {0, 1}, which is not determinate. For X u.d. on {0, 1}, the ratio B(ps)/|s| is maximized by the trace s = a · a, for which
ps = 1/2 (it occurs iff X = 0), hence R(P ; X˜) = B(1/2)2 = 1/2 (note that the trace s = a yields no information on x, as it can be
performed regardless of the value of x). On the other hand, all traces of *P are of the form a · · · a and occur with probability 1:
that is ps = 1 for any trace s of that form, and ps = 0 for traces of a different form. Hence H(ps) = 0 for all s, and R(P ; X˜) = 0.
As a counter-example to inequality (b), consider P′(x) = [x = 0]a.b+ stop.a+ [x = 1]a, with x : {0, 1}, which, again, is not
determinate. For X u.d. on {0, 1}, the ratioB(ps)/|s| is maximized by the trace s = a · b, for which ps = 1/2 (it occurs iff X = 0),
hence R(P′ ; X˜) = B(1/2)
2
= 1/2. On the other hand, *P′ has a shorter trace s = b, which arises from interaction between a in
P′ and [x = 0]a.b in *P′ (recall that *P′ def= P′; *P′) and occurs with probability 1/2 (i.e. iff X = 0). Hence R(*P′ ; X˜) = 1.
7.3. Rate of leakage and other security measures
It is easy to relate rate of leakage to error probability and guesswork, along the lines of Section 6. We show the details
of the error probability case, and just state the result for the case of guesswork, as the details can be easily ﬁlled in by the
reader.
We consider the attacker’s error probability of guessing X after an effort of N ≥ 0 synchronizations with P. Assuming X
has outcomes in U, this probability can be deﬁned as
εX ,P,N
def= inf
g,T˜ :|T˜ |≤N
Pr
(
g(P(X)||T˜) /= X
)
where g ranges over all functions of type {S, F}* → U. That is, g takes a sequence of test outcomes – success or failure – and
yields a guess for the value of X .
Like in the case of absolute leakage, we rely on Fano’s Inequality (10). For arbitrary but ﬁxed g and T˜ s.t. |T˜ | ≤ N, from (10)
we get that:
Pr
(
g(P(X)||T˜) /= X
)
≥ ε
X ,P(X)||T˜ ≥
H(X | P(X)||T˜) − 1
log |X| =
H(X) − I(X ; P(X)||T˜) − 1
log |X| .
But, by Proposition 7.2(b), I(X ; P˜(X)||T˜) ≤ NR(P;X), hence we get
Pr
(
g(P(X)||T˜) /= X
)
≥ H(X) − NR(P;X) − 1
log |X| .
Since T˜ and g are arbitrary, we get
εX ,P,N ≥ H(X) − NR(P;X) − 1
log |X| .
In complete analogy, we can deﬁne guesswork for X after N synchronizations with P as GP,N(X)
def= inf |T˜ |≤N G(X | P(X)||T˜)
and prove the following lower bound:
GP,N(X) ≥ 2
H(X)−NR(P;X) + 1
e
.
8. An extended example
We analyze absolute leakage and rate of leakage of a non-trivial system inspired by – butmuch simpler than – anonymity
protocols in the style of Crowds [28]. A typical goal of these protocols is allowing a group of users to exchangemessages over
a public network, while hiding the identities of the senders of individual messages from an external (passive) eavesdropper.
An essential ingredient to achieve this goal is a routing policy of messages that aims at confounding the eavesdropper as
to who is sending to whom at any given moment. Here we consider one such policy for a simple ring-shaped network and
quantify the average information leaked to the eavesdropper about the sender, the receiver and the message in a run of the
protocol. The average is taken with respect to the random choice of the sender, of the receiver and of the message. In the
three subsections below, we give a description of the system and then discuss its absolute leakage and rate of leakage. In that
discussion, for the sake of readability we have preferred not to dwell on technical details, which can be found in Appendix 9.
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A1 A2
A3A4
Fig. 2. A ring-shaped network with N = 4 nodes.
8.1. Description of the system
Aset ofN ≥ 2nodesA1, ...,AN are connected throughN public, unidirectional channels so as to forma ring-shapednetwork.
This is shown in Fig. 2 for N = 4. The purpose of a run of the protocol is to let a sender node As transmit a one-bit message
m ∈ {0, 1} to a receiver node Ar . The pieces of information represented by r,m and s should be concealed. Since As and Ar may
possibly be not directly connected, the messagemmay have to be routed through intermediate nodes. The protocol consists
of N stages. To confound the eavesdropper, at each stage, every node Aj sends a message to the next node in the ring, Aj+1
(all indices here are intended modN). More precisely, the node that currently holds the "genuine" messagem – initially As –
sendsm, while any other node sends an arbitrarily chosen bitm′. Each Aj must receive amessage from Aj−1 before proceeding
to the next stage. Note that after (r − s) mod N stages, messagem has actually reached the receiver Ar: the remaining stages
are executed for the sole purpose of hiding the relation between s and r.
We make a few assumptions to make our analysis feasible. We analyze leakage due to a single node of the network, say
Aj with j ∈ 1..N. In other words, we consider a situation where a local attacker eavesdrops on a single node Aj . The attacker
can observe incoming and outgoing messages, but cannot tamper with them. He can, however, force the re-execution of the
whole protocol with the same parameters (e.g., by fooling participants into believing that some messages sent to Aj have
been lost). We furthermore assume that the secrets r, m and s, as well as any routing information needed by them, have
somehow been distributed securely to the participants prior to the protocol’s execution – that is, we do notmodel the secure
distribution of the secret parameters.
The behaviour of the jth node of the network from the point of view of the attacker is modeled by the process Aj deﬁned
below. There, s, r, i are variables of type 1..N and m is a variable of type 0..1. We use input actions in0 and in1 (resp. output
actions out0 and out1) to denote the reception (resp. sending) of bits 0 and 1 from the node Aj−1 (resp. to the node Aj+1).
We make use of the following notational shorthand. " if φ then P else Q" stands for φP + ¬φQ ; moreover, "inx.Q", where
x is a variable of type 0..1, stands for [x = 0]in0.Q [0/x] + [x = 1]in1.Q [1/x]; similarly for outx.Q . We denote by path(s, j, r) the
predicate that is true if and only if node j is in the path from s to r (e.g., path(3, 4, 1) holds true for a conﬁguration of N = 4
nodes; note that we set path(s, j, s) to true only if j = s). Finally, we consider the predicate holds(s, j, r, i) which tells if node j
will hold the genuine message at the beginning of ith stage, counting stages from 0 to N − 1; formally
holds(s, j, r, i) iff path(s, j, r) and i = j − s mod N .
E.g. holds(3, 4, 1, 1) holds true in the conﬁguration with 4 nodes.
Bj(s, r,m, i) represents Aj ’s behaviour from the i
th stage onward, counting stages from 0 through N − 1.
Aj(s, r,m)
def= Bj(s, r,m, 0)
Bj(s, r,m, i)
def= (i < N)
(
if holds(s, j, r, i) then outm
else out0 + out1
| if holds(s, j − 1, r, i) then inm.Bj(s, r,m, i + 1)
else in0.Bj(s, r,m, i + 1) + in1.Bj(s, r,m, i + 1)
)
.
The two threads that compose Bj correspond to the following behaviour:
• at each stage, Aj must send a bit to its successor in the ring: if Aj currently holds the genuine messagem, then it is thism
that will be sent (this is the ﬁrst then branch), otherwise 0 or 1 will be nondeterministically chosen and sent (this is the
ﬁrst else branch);
• at each stage, Aj must receive a bit from its predecessor in the ring: if Aj−1 currently holds the genuine message m, then
it is thism that will be received (this is the second then branch), otherwise otherwise 0 or 1 will be nondeterministically
chosen and received (this is the second else branch).
To exemplify the functioning of the node, let us instantiate the above speciﬁcation of Bj to the case s = 1, j = 3 and r = 4,
for the 4-nodes network in Fig. 8.1. We get the following relations which explain the behaviour of the system (recall that ∼
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denotes strong bisimilarity):
B3(1, 4,m, 0) ∼ out0 + out1 | in0.B3(1, 4,m, 1) + in1.B3(1, 4,m, 1)
B3(1, 4,m, 1) ∼ out0 + out1 | inm.B3(1, 4,m, 2)
B3(1, 4,m, 2) ∼ outm | in0.B3(1, 4,m, 3) + in1.B3(1, 4,m, 3)
B3(1, 4,m, 3) ∼ out0 + out1 | in0 + in1 .
(15)
Note that this is a description of Aj ’s behaviour from the point of view of the attacker. This description says little about the
"physical" implementation of the node. Indeed, routing information would normally be found in message headers and not
"hardwired" into the processes (see also Remark 8.1 below).
In the analysis below,we assume the receiver r, the sender s and themessagem are chosen according to three independent
random variables S, R andM, respectively, with S and R uniformly distributed. We let h = H(M) (this is 1 bit ifM is chosen at
random). We want to analyze absolute leakage and rate of leakage relative to the random variable
Z
def= Aj(S,R,M) .
8.2. Absolute leakage
We ﬁrst assume the attacker already knows a piece of information Y telling him whether j is in the path from S to R
(Y = true) or not (Y = false). We discuss the two cases separately.
In the case Y = false, at each stage both else branches are taken, as neither of the two instances of holds(·) ever evaluates
to true. As easily seen, the resulting behaviour of Bj , hence of Aj , does not depend on S, R or M. Therefore, in this case the
absolute leakage due to Aj is 0, that is, the attacker does not learn anything, apart from the very fact that j is not in the path:
H(Z | Y = false) = 0 .
In the second case, the attacker, by observing Aj , can tell at which stage i the genuine messagem is sent to the successor.
Intuitively, in all (re-)executions of the protocol there is a unique stage at which it is always ﬁred the same output (outm),
rather than one of two possible (out0 + out1); see e.g. the equations (15) above, where the stage in question is i = 2. This way,
the attacker can tell the distance between S and j, hence the identity of the sender S, since j is known. As a consequence, he
can also tell the value ofm, which is directly observed at stage i. He cannot tell the identity of the receiver, though. Therefore,
in this case the absolute leakage due to Aj is
H(Z | Y = true) = H(S) + H(M) = logN + h .
Now, j is found in the path from the sender to the receiver approximately in half of the cases, that is the probability that
Y = true is about 1
2
(for large values of N; the exact value is given in the appendix). Hence H(Y) ≈ 1. The overall leakage can
hence be computed as
A(Aj; S,R,M) = H(Z)
= H(Z ,Y)
= H(Y) + H(Z | Y)
≈ 1+ 1
2
H(Z | Y = true) = 1+ 1
2
(logN + h) .
where in the second equality we have used the fact that H(Z) = H(Z ,Y), that is, if observing Z , observing also Y does not
provide additional information. The above formula can be interpreted as follows: when the number of nodes is large, Aj leaks
on the average approximately half of the message content and half of the bits of the sender’s identity, plus one bit saying
whether Aj is in the path from the sender to the receiver. Intuitively, this is the case because in half of the cases, i.e. when j
is not in the sender-receiver path, the attacker cannot say anything about M, S and R – apart from the very fact that j is not
in the path – while in the other half of the cases, when j is in the path, the attacker can tell precisely S andM.
8.3. Rate of leakage
For any trace t, let pt be Pr(Aj(S,R,M)
t⇒). The rate we have to estimate is the supremum of
B(pt)
|t|
taken over all nonempty traces t. For reasons explained in the appendix, without loss of generality we can conﬁne ourselves
to examining traces where output actions are ﬁred eagerly, that is traces of the form
t = outm0 · inm′1 · outm1 · · · inm′k · outmk
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with 0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 andmi,m′i ∈ 0..1. Let us now estimate the probability pt .
In the ﬁrst place, it holds that pt ≥ 12 , as shown below. Now, the binary entropy function B(p) attains its maximum in
the point p = 1/2 (see Fig. 1); hence, in order to maximize B(p)/|t|, while keeping |t| ﬁxed, it is convenient to choose t that
minimizes pt , i.e. makes pt as close as possible to
1
2
.
As explained below, this is achieved if t is chosen such that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k,m′
i
/= mi. By inspection of the code of Aj , such
a trace can be performed if and only if the following predicate depending on S, R andM is true (here and in the following we
abbreviate holds(S, j,R, i) as holds(i)):
condt(S,R,M) = (¬holds(0) ∨M = m0) ∧
k∧
i=1
¬holds(i) .
This means: if the node holds the genuine message at stage 0, then the output m0 observed at stage 0 must be the genuine
message; moreover, at none of the k subsequent stages may the node hold the genuine message, as the output at stage i,mi,
can be different from the input at the preceding stage,m′
i
, if and only if the node does not hold the message at stage i. Thus,
pt is the probability of condt(R, S,M) to hold true. Note that considering a trace with m
′
i
= mi for some i ≥ 1 would lead to
replacing some "¬holds(i)" conjuncts in the above condition with the weaker "¬holds(i) ∨M = mi", which would make for
a higher probability.
By simple logical manipulation, the condition condt(S,R,M) is seen to be equivalent to the following:
(holds(0) ∧M = m0) ∨
k∧
i=0
¬holds(i) (16)
It is easy to evaluate separately the probability of the two disjuncts in the condition. Indeed, holds(0) is equivalent to S = j
(the sendermust coincidewith the node for the node to hold themessage at stage 0). For simplicity, assume Pr(M = m0) = 12
(this does not really affect the result of the analysis). By independence of S andM we have
Pr(holds(0) ∧M = m0) = 1
2N
.
The second disjunct in (16) has the following probability (the computation is detailed in the appendix):
Pr
⎛
⎝ k∧
i=0
¬holds(i)
⎞
⎠ = 1− k + 1
N
(
1− k
2N
)
.
Since the two disjuncts in (16) do not intersect (as holds(0) and ¬holds(0) cannot be true at the same time), we can sum up
their probabilities and get
pt = 1
2N
+ 1− k + 1
N
(
1− k
2N
)
.
As k goes from0 toN − 1, pt decreases from1− 12N to itsminimal value 12 . This shows that pt ≥ 12 . The ratio B(pt )|t| as a function
of k is plotted in Fig. 3 in the case of N = 100 nodes. As seen, the maximum is obtained for k = 0, yielding a rate of
R(Aj ; S,R,M) = B
(
1
2N
)
. (17)
(we have used the fact that B(1− p) = B(p)). Hence the traces that maximize the ratio are t = outm0 withm0 ∈ 0..1. Each of
these two traces conveys very little information to the attacker, just telling him that it if S = j thenM = m0. As an example, in
the case of N = 100 nodes, B(pt) ≈ 0.045 bits. As k increases, the conveyed information B(pt) grows, but much slower than
the length of the trace |t|, so that the ratio goes down.
Remark 8.1 In a more realistic scenario, the routing information would be found in message headers rather than being
hardwired in the nodes. Since routing information cannot be sent in the clear, some encryption mechanism would be also
called for. Conceivably, the resulting system would be more secure than the one discussed above. In particular, the attacker
would not be able to tell the stage at which the genuine message is sent (provided randomized encryption were adopted);
hence also the identity of the sender and of themessagewould be fully protected.We cannot directly deal with cryptography
and describe such a system in the present framework.
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Fig. 3. Plot of B(pt )/|t| as a function of k (N = 100).
9. Conclusion and related work
We have presented two quantitative models of information leakage for processes. Relationships existing among these
two models and a functional notion of secrecy have been studied. The compositionality properties of the models have also
been investigated.
The idealized, "all powerful" adversary encompassed by our models may turn out to be too strong for many practical
purposes. There is much work to be done in order to go from the present theoretical treatment to a more practical one. In
particular, the ability to show an absence of leakage at the language level does not imply that there will be no leakage at the
implementation level, although it helps to constrain the types of attacks that can be used effectively, by forcing an attacker to
require some additional knowledge relating to, e.g., timing. In a probabilistic settingwhere each process induces a probability
distribution over the set of traces, it may be sensible to stipulate that low-probability traces are more difﬁcult, or costly, to
detect for the adversary than high-probability traces. This is impossible to describe in the present model, basically because,
no matter how improbable a speciﬁc trace is, the attacker can detect that trace with a null effort. In the future, we plan to
examine enhancements of the model involving probabilistic and possibly cryptographic features.
Use of conditional mutual information as a measure of leakage in computing systems can be traced back to Millen [26]
and to Gray [18]. In the context of sequential, imperative programs, the signiﬁcance of this measure with respect to different
metrics of security has been further clariﬁed by Clark, Hunt andMalacaria in [10,12,11]. In particular, our Theorem5.1, stating
equivalence of zero leakage and secrecy, is clearly related to Millen’s result [26] that null conditional mutual information is
equivalent to non-interference in the case of computing automata. In a language-based setting, essentially the same result
has been proved by Clark et al. (Proposition 4.2 of [10]). Malacaria’s recent work on the security of looping constructs [24]
extends [10] by introducing a notion of rate for loops in imperative programs. We also mention Volpano and Smith’s [34],
where a quantiﬁed theory of non-interference for imperative programs is developed, including a notion of rate of leakage,
albeit not based on Information Theory. Di Pierro et al. [15] propose a notion of indistinguishability for probabilistic constraint
programs and study its relationship with certain security measures, such as the average number of runs necessary for an
attacker to tell two systems apart.
It is worth to notice that the abovementionedworks presuppose terminating computations that produce a set of "results"
with a probability distribution. As such they are not appropriate to a process algebraic setting, where one just cares about
the interactive behaviours of systems (and computations may be non-terminating).
Mutual information is also at the heart of the notion of channel capacity, which is deﬁned as the maximum mutual
information between the source and the output of a (noisy) channel. Indeed, it is perfectly sensible to view a computing
system (programor process) as a channel, where the source is represented by the sensitive information onewishes to conceal
and the output is whatever "observable" is appropriate for the system under consideration (state variables or behaviours).
This analogy is pursued in recent works on anonymity protocols by Chatzikokolakis, Palamidessi and collaborators [8,7].
As expected, a basic result in this setting is that perfect anonymity corresponds to zero capacity. There is, however, an
important difference between their anonymity-based approach and those based on secrecy/non-interference (including
ours). In essence, the protocol models of [8,7] rely on noise to conceal sensitive information in the system, e.g. sender’s
identity: the noisier the channel, the lesser the capacity, themore secure is deemed the system. Noise generation is modeled
by resorting to probabilistic choice. On the other hand, languages considered in secrecy/non-interference frameworks do
not necessarily feature probabilistic operators (ours does not, neither do the languages of e.g. [10,24]). Indeed, in these
languages, it is intended that programmers conceal a sensitive piece of information X essentially via distortion. In coding
theory, distortion is the loss of information that occurs when a source X is coded unfaithfully, i.e. using a number of bits
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smaller than required. In ourmodel of absolute leakage, X is "coded up" andmade available to the attacker as the r.v. Z = P(X)
and proper distortion happens ifH(Z) < H(X). For uniformly distributed X , distortion is realized if the function u → [P(u)] is
non-injective,with the ideal case being that this function is a constant. Itwould be interesting to combine the two approaches
(noise-based and distortion-based) into a single framework.
In the realm of process algebras, a paper by Lowe [23] has introduced a notion of quantitative non-interference for timed
csp, deﬁned as the number of different observable "low" behaviours that a "high" user can induce on the process. This
deﬁnition is shown to be in agreement with a functional notion of lack of information ﬂow due to Focardi and Gorrieri
[16], which can be regarded as a process-algebraic version of functional non-interference (a probabilistic extension of this
equivalence is in Aldini et al.’s [2]). This result is somehow related to Wittbold’s [35], where various notions of lack of
information ﬂow for nondeterministic systems, like non-deducibility and forward correctability, are assessed on the basis
of information-theoretic arguments. In [23], a notion of rate is also introduced that corresponds to the ratio of leaked
information/elapsed time. Lowe’s model is not easily comparable to ours, due to the different goals and settings (secrecy
vs. process-algebraic non-interference, untimed vs. timed). For example, as noted by Lowe, a notion of rate directly based
on elapsed time is to some extent unsatisfactory: a process that leaks one Gigabyte during the ﬁrst second of its execution
and then remains silent forever has a leakage rate of 0, and as such should be deemed as secure. A similar drawback, in a
sequential/imperative setting, arises in the mentioned [24], where the leakage rate of a looping construct is obtained as the
ratio of absolute leakage and number of iterations of the loop.
Finally, it is worth to mention some recent work in Information Security that addresses the issue of side-channels attacks
against cryptographic hardware from an information-theoretic perspective very similar in spirit to that presented here: see
e.g. [22,31,32]. As an example, the analysis of the modular exponentiation algorithm found in [22] bears some similarities to
our absolute leakage model (Example 5.5). We leave for future work the task of establishing a precise connection between
our models and these approaches.
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Appendix A. Summary of notation
Information theory
Pr(A) probability Pr(A | B) conditional probability
X random variable X˜ vector of random variables
H(X) entropy H(X | Y) conditional entropy
I(X;Y) mutual information I(X;Y | Z) conditional mutual information
p˜ probability distribution H(p˜) entropy of distribution
B(p) binary entropy function
Process theory
a, b channel names x, y variables
u, v values σ substitution
φ formula σ |= φ satisfaction
P process P(x˜) open process
s trace P
s⇒ process performs trace
 behavioural equivalence [P] behavioural equivalence class
 trace equivalence ∼ strong bisimilarity
C[ · ] context C[P] process replaces hole
T test |T | cost of test
Information leakage in processes
P(X˜) open process as random variable
P(X˜)||T test on process as random variable
P(X˜)
s⇒ process trace as random variable
A
(
P ; X˜ | Y˜
)
absolute leakage from X˜ to P given Y˜
R
(
P ; X˜
)
leakage rate of P relative to X˜
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Appendix B. Deﬁnition of leakage rate for name-passing processes
We give a deﬁnition of rate in the pi-calculus and then show that it enjoys a trace-based characterization analogous to
that provided by Proposition 7.1 in the case without name-passing. Reformulating and extending the rest of the results of
Section 7 to the pi-calculus is then amatter of routine, and is left to the interested reader. Note that the deﬁnition of rate seen
in Section 7.4 does not apply "as is" to the pi-calculus, as each input preﬁx a(x).P with x : S gives rise to inﬁnitelymany traces,
corresponding to the inﬁnitely many instantiations of the input parameter xwith names in the sort S. However, once a test T
and a process P have been ﬁxed, the "relevant" traces of T are only those that have a chance of giving rise to a synchronization
with P. In particular, the set of possible instantiations of x can be restricted to a (super)set of the free names of P, say N. This
is the intuition behind the notion of N-trace given below.
For ease of presentation, in our treatment below we stick to a monadic pi-calculus, that is, we consider only processes
with action preﬁxes carrying one object, that take the form a(x).P or ae.P. We shall abbreviate (νb)ab.P as a(b).P when a /= b.
For the sake of symmetry, we shall also admit input preﬁxes of the form a(b).P, where the formal parameter is a name b : S
for some S.
In what follows, we let s, s′ range over traces of the form μ1 · · ·μn with n ≥ 0 and μi ::= ad
∣∣∣ a(b) ∣∣∣ ad ∣∣∣ a(b) ∣∣∣ ω and
d ::= a|v. These traces are taken up to alpha-equivalence, once a(b) and a(b) are considered as binders for name b. Moreover,
it is assumed that actions in traces respect the given sorting system. The set of names occurring free in input subject position
in swill be denoted by ifn(s). Finally, we write A
a(b)−−−→ A′ if A ab−−→ A′ and b /∈ fn(A): thus A s⇒ is well-deﬁned for any trace s
in the syntax described above.
Deﬁnition B.1 (N-Traces). Let N be a ﬁnite set of names and A be a process or a test. We say s is a N-trace of A if A
s⇒ and
ifn(s) ⊆ N. We say (N, s) may lead A to success if s is nonempty, ω does not occur in s and s · ω is a N-trace of A.
In what follows, P(x˜) is an open process and X˜ a r.v. A test T is a ﬁnite process possibly using the distinct action ω. Clearly,
a test has only a ﬁnite number of N-traces.
Deﬁnition B.2 (Rate of leakage). For each test T and ﬁnite set of names N, the N-cost of T is
|T |N def=
∑
s: (N, s) may lead T to success
|s| .
The leakage rate of P relative to X˜ is
R(P ; X˜) def= sup
N, T : fn(P)⊆N, |T |N>0
H
(
P(X˜)‖T
)
|T |N .
To prove the analog of Proposition 7.1 we need some additional deﬁnitions and terminology. Given a trace s not containing
ω, the test sˆN that checks for the presence of a N-trace s in a process with free names ⊆ N is deﬁned by induction on s as
follows:
• εˆN = ω
• ̂ad · s′N = ad.sˆ′N
• ̂a(b) · s′N = a(b).sˆ′N∪{b}
• ̂ad · s′N = a(x).[x = d]sˆ′N
• ̂a(b) · s′N = a(b).[b /∈ N]sˆ′N∪{b}.
For instance, if s = a(b) · c(d) · db and N = {a, c} then sˆN = a(b).c(d).[d /∈ {a, c, b}].d(y).[y = b]ω. For a trace s, its complement s
is deﬁned by inverting polarities of its actions (i.e. by turning inputs into outputs, and vice-versa, and leaving the object part
unchanged). E.g., for s as deﬁned above we have s = a(b) · c(d) · db. Clearly s = s.
The following lemma summarizes what we need to know about sˆN . The proof is routine and omitted.
Lemma B.1. Let N be a ﬁnite set of names.
(a) Let Q be a closed process and s a trace with ifn(s) ∪ fn(Q ) ⊆ N. Then s is a N-trace of Q if and only if Q‖sˆN ω⇒ .
(b) Let T be a test and let S be the set of traces s that s.t. (N, s) may lead T to success. Then
T 
∑
s∈S
sˆN + F
for some F that has no trace s s.t. (N, s) may lead F to success.
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(c) For each trace s, we have |sˆN |N = |s| = |s|.
Proposition B.1. It holds that
R(P ; X˜) = sup
|s|>0
H
(
P(X˜)
s⇒
)
|s| (18)
Proof. By the previous lemma, part (a), for any trace s, P(X˜)
s⇒ is equivalent to P(X˜)‖sˆN , for some N ⊇ fn(P, s). By this fact
and by the previous lemma part (c) the rhs of (18) is not greater than the lhs. For the opposite inequality, ﬁx any ﬁnite N
with N ⊇ fn(P), ﬁx any T with |T |N > 0 and let S be the set traces s s.t. (N, s) may lead T to success. By the previous lemma,
part (b), and by simple -preserving transformations, we can show that, for any Q with fn(Q ) ⊆ N:
Q‖T  Q‖
⎛
⎝∑
s∈S
sˆN + F
⎞
⎠ ∑
s∈S
(Q‖sˆN)
(note in particular that Q‖F  0, as no (N, s) may lead F to success). Hence T
P,X˜
= P(X˜)‖T is equivalent to∑s∈S(P(X˜)‖sˆN) as
a r.v. Using this fact and the inequality provided by Proposition 5.1 with C[·] =∑s∈S([·]) (or relying on the data processing
inequality), we have that
H(T
P,X˜
)/|T |N = H
⎛
⎝∑
s∈S
P(X˜)‖sˆN
⎞
⎠ /|T |N ≤
⎛
⎝∑
s∈S
H(P(X˜)‖sˆN)
⎞
⎠ /|T |N .
In the last term, we can replace P(X˜)‖sˆN by P(X˜) s⇒ (by the previous lemma, part (a)), hence H(P(X˜)‖sˆN) byB(ps). Moreover,
by the previous lemma, parts (b) and (c), we can replace |T |N by
∑
s∈S |s| =
∑
s∈S |s|. The thesis then follows by applying
inequality (14). 
Appendix C. Details of the example in Section 8
C.1. Analysis of absolute leakage
It is handier to ﬁrst analyze a case where the attacker knows whether the node j is or is not in the path from the sender
to the receiver. That is, we consider the side-information given by the random variable
Y
def= path(S, j,R)
and we want to ﬁrst compute
A(Aj ; S,R,M | Y) = H(Z | Y) .
The random variable D
def= (j − S) mod N measures the distance between the sender S and j. If j is in the path from S to R
(Y = true), then the behaviour of Aj is such that at the Dth stage of the protocol, Aj can only ﬁre a unique output outm with
m = M, while at any other stage it can nondeterministically choose to between out0 and out1 (intuitively, the attacker can
tell these two situations apart by repeatedly executing Aj and recording at which stage it always observes the same output).
In other words, Aj ’s behaviour in this case depends solely on D and onM, in the sense that different values for the pair (D,M)
correspond to different behaviours of Aj . Noting that D can take on the values 0, 1, ...,N − 1 with uniform probability, these
considerations yield
H(Z | Y = true) = H(D,M) = H(D) + H(M) = logN + h.
On the other hand, if j is not in the path from S to R (Y = false), the then branches are never taken and the behaviour of Aj is
independent from S,R andM. Hence
H(Z | Y = false) = 0.
Now, an easy counting argument shows that the probability of Y = true is ≈ 1
2
, more precisely Pr(Y = true) = 1
2
(1+ 1N ), so
that
H(Z | Y) = Pr(Y = true)H(Z | Y = true) = 1
2
(
1+ 1
N
) (
logN + h) .
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Finally, we can compute the absolute leakage H(Z) using ﬁrst the chain rule to derive the formula
H(Z) = H(Y) + H(Z | Y) − H(Y | Z)
and then noting that H(Y | Z) = 0: indeed, Y is determined by Z , as j is in the path from S to R if and only if at some stage of
Z a unique output, rather than two possible, can be observed. To sum up
A(Aj ; S,R,M) = B
(
1
2
(
1+ 1
N
))
+ 1
2
(
1+ 1
N
)
(logN + h) ≈ 1+ 1
2
(logN + h) .
C.2. Analysis of rate of leakage
Let t be any trace with non-zero probability of Z = Aj(S,R,M), that is, assume pt def= Pr(Z t⇒) > 0.
Firing output actions eagerly maximizes entropy The following considerations can be justiﬁed by inspection of Aj ’s code. Let
O be the number of output actions in t, then: (a) t must contain at least O− 1 input actions; (b) if t contains more than O
input actions, then there is a shorter trace t′ obtained by erasing some input action such that Z t⇒ if and only if Z t′⇒; (c) if t
contains either O or O− 1 input and O output actions, there is a permutation t′ of t where input and output actions alternate
with one another such that Z
t⇒ if and only if Z t′⇒. Using repeatedly (a,b,c) above, it follows that, when looking for a trace
t maximizing the ratio B(pt)/|t|, we can restrict ourselves to traces of one of two forms
(1) t = outm0 ·inm′1 · outm1 · · · inm′k · outmk
(2) t = inm′
1
· outm1 · · · inm′k · outmk
with 0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 andmi,m′i ∈ 0..1. The analysis of traces of the form (2) is similar to the one for traces of the form (1), seen
in Section 8. In particular, the maximum ratio B(pt)/|t| can be computed similarly and is lower than that achievable using
traces of the form (1). The details are left to the interested reader.
Evaluating the probability of
∧k
i=0 ¬holds(i). Using De Morgan’s law, the condition
∧k
i=0 ¬holds(i) can be written as
¬(∨ki=0 holds(i)). Since the holds(i)’s do not intersect with each other (holds(i) ∧ holds(i′) is false for i /= i′), the probability
of this event can be written as
1−
k∑
i=0
Pr(holds(i)) .
A simple counting arguments shows that Pr(holds(i)) = 1N (1− iN ) (indeed, the value of S is ﬁxed and there are N − i possible
values for R, out of N2 possible values for the pair (S,R)). Using the formula for the sum of the integers from 1 to k yields
k∑
i=0
Pr(holds(i)) = k + 1
N
(
1− k
2N
)
hence the result.
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